Was Operation Market Garden Doomed to Fail? | James Holland & Al Murray | WW2 Walking The Ground

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

If you are enjoying walking the ground with Jim and Al, please do like our videos and subscribe to the channel. We are so appreciative of all the comments and support. As you were 🫡

[@adrianbay1496]

Absolutely love this series . Heavy subject matter , light banter without undermining the men who suffered so much .Really informative and in depth without giving brain ache . Wonderful . :)

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

Thank you Adrian. This is exactly what we aimed for with the series. We never forget the sacrifices and bravery of these men whilst keeping their stories alive.

[@pinchus34]

Couldn’t agree more…

[@enright13]

I'm walking the ground at the moment with the help of these videos and the maps in "Arnhem Black Tuesday". I went to the Airborne At The Bridge museum, then Oosterbeek War Cemetery for the Remembrance Sunday Service, and after that the Hartenstein Museum. Tomorrow it'll be Son, Gravy (!) and Nijimegen bridges, with a pint at the Blaawe Hand to finish. Oh and the ladies at the Hartenstein are going to get their book buyer to look into getting some copies of "Arnhem Black Tuesday" on sale! Now about that commission... 😉

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

@@enright13 THANK YOU!

[@Marcelpeterbos]

It is called ‘the blue hand’ (de blaauwe hand) cause back in the day they used to make cloth in indigo! All the workers that came in for a pint had blue hands. It’s written on e plaque in the arch to the church.

[@Williestyle-RobotechxMacross-x]

Thank you for this history! (:

[@DIVERBLOKE1]

Perfect piece of history, well done.

[@MbSaidSo]

Tabletop exercises down the pub should be THE method for teaching history. Another great episode, Gents. Thanks for all you are doing to keep the stories alive.

[@A.J.K87]

Living in the area I've grown up with all the stories of Market Garden. It's wonderful to see you make this series. I think your observations are refreshing. These are things I and many people who live here have talked about for a long time. It just seems that there are many historians who live far away are making observations solely based on maps and reports etc. Actually walking the grounds and matching the stories to the locations gives such valuable insights.

[@pauljane3323]

Fellas, what can I say? I've thoroughly enjoyed both the Normandy episodes and the Dutch ones. Incredibly informative, done with great knowledge, passion, enthusiasm, and humour. But above all, respect for those who were there and fighting towards the goal of Berlin. I've another trip planned for both areas next year, and along with the books you've mentioned ( yep, got yours al, as well as some of james) it's going to be far more meaningful. Thankyou guys, just brilliant. More please!

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

@@pauljane3323 Thanks very much Paul.

[@geraintowen7028]

It’s a stunningly brilliant yet simple concept - walk the battlefield ! But when told by 2 blokes who not only know their subject inside out but are also clearly good friends, it’s utterly brilliant. I love all the knowledgable insights and map views and how they correspond to observations on the ground. It’s just a shame I have to wait a week between each episode.

[@A.J.K87]

You mentioned the bombing of Nijmegen. My great grandfather was there when it happened. He had cycled from his home in Leur to Nijmegen to take the train to Arnhem when the bombers flew over and started bombing the city. He and others took refuge under the train. He was near the back of the train. The front of the train was hit, but luckily he made it out alive. After the bombing he had to move through many dead people to get to his bicycle to be able to get home again. He came home covered in blood, to the horror of my grandmother.

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

Thank you for sharing this reminder of the horrors faced by citizens. We found the photos of bombed out Nijmegen so hard square with the calm, elegance of the city today.

[@mariodriessen9740]

Approximately 800 people died when the allied forces bombed Nijmegen on February the 22nd 1944. My father, who lived near the train station, was 10 years old when it happened and he needed to search for my grandfather (his father) among the large number of deaths. My dad saw a body and thought he found him, turned the corpse and looked into its blood-soaked eyes. It was ‘just’ an unknown man to him, but he never forgot. How could he?

[@anthonychase4364]

I wish my dad were around. He joined the Paras as an 18 year old in 1944. Brilliant series, thank you.

[@douglaskillock3537]

Nice to see our boys doing us proud. A beer each in around 15 minutes despite all that chatting. So we're on pace for four beers an hour. Outstanding! Just don't try that with anything near 8%

[@rogerpoole8253]

I think the way you have told the stories has been so much better than a lot of other documentaries. Seems far more real

[@ben-jam-in6941]

Best series on the tube right now. Goodness knows I’ve watched all the decent war especially WW2 documentaries to death. Thanks guys I’d sure love to have been with you guys throughout the trip thus far. Cheers from across the big pond.

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

Thank you for the kind words! And thank you for watching!

[@Ekatjam]

My uncle was in HQ 1st Battalion 508 PIR. He was killed on the 20th of September in the Village of Beek with the goal of cutting the Wylerbahn highway going to Nijmegen. After surviving Normandy, he told his buddies before the jump that he was never leaving Holland alive.

[@colinmartin2921]

Respect.

[@MegaJean40]

James Holland and Al Murray are fantastic. I hope James Holland write a book about operation Market Garden and the Arnhem book from Al Murray is great.

[@alexrandall3685]

I have been an avid watcher since the D-Day series. Enjoyed these videos immensely. Have recently finished a second listen of Al's Black Tuesday audio book. Thank you for writing, and reading such an emotive, brilliant and unfortunately bitterly sad story. Made me respect even more the bravery of the airborne forces.

[@polocathmhaoil9141]

Al Murray, I find that I could listen to your narrative all day. You aren't just knowledgeable about Arnhem, the way you go about it makes me want to go and visit there. I went over the rail bridge about 20 years ago en route to Paderborn so didn't see much. Please keep these series going please.

[@cosimagrundkotter906]

Thank you so very much for doing this! There are so many half-baked, confusing documentaries about Market Garden, but you making your points very clear, having great maps at hand with the actual sites to see - that's a thrilling history lesson, once again. Okay, the German point of view is a bit out of focus, but it's complex enough without that perspective already. Very well done!

[@connorrichardson9501]

I just want to say thank you guys, between discovering this and the podcast a few months back I’ve been utterly enthralled with the war again, something I’ve not been since I was in school. The new perspectives and information I’ve learnt from you guys has been fascinating and I can’t wait to keep learning more and understanding this monumental part of our history. Keep up the amazing work! ☺️

[@theoldplankwoodworks2415]

Nothing beats walking the ground… thanks for allowing us to tag along

[@MatthewsSoloChannel-f3u]

I love this guys, it feels like you're a couple of old friends of mine talking about military history.

[@WilliamSandford-y2n]

I covered the area of Market Garden. My Regiment the RCR took over control from the 82Airborne. The trophy for the the Soldier of the year in 3RCR is a Thompson machine gun “borrowed” from the 82.

[@Strawberry-12.]

I think you mean Strategically Transferred Equipment Alternate Location

[@phillipbrown9661]

This is literally how I spend my evenings in the pub with my mates about this operation!!!! Top series guys👍👍👍

[@blue20012]

This series has rapidly become my favourite channel on KZbin - I really hope to see Al and James don Pub Landlord blazers for their next pub visit!

[@jamesbody4399]

Another brilliant video, keep up the great work. Booked to follow your footsteps early next year, I can't wait, you explain everything so well. Thank you James and Al.

[@KimBowen-oz3gz]

Great series Al and Jim…. You question why the British did not use the first day’s DZ instead of Ginkel Heath on day 2. The simple reason is that the original DZ was being used as a glider LZ on the 18th, Ginkel Heath being less than ideal for gliders and the day 1 zones being somewhat full of gliders already. The only other alternative would have been the Polish zone at Johannahoeve which could have been used by 4th Brigade on the 18th and the Polish gliders on the following day. I don’t know if this was considered as it would certainly have allowed 4th Brigade to link up with the rest of the division more quickly and the KOSB need not then have had to redeploy from Ginkel to Johannahoeve to cover both landings on the 18th and 19th. The only fly in the ointment it seems to me would be the supposed flak concentrations at Arnhem and Deelen which might have been able to come into play

[@corychecketts]

“He’s Jumpin’ Jim Gavin not Walkin’ Jim Gavin!” Bloody brilliant as always.

[@alexcane4498]

The best podcasts are like overhearing an interesting conversation in a pub. End of.

[@mikkoveijalainen7430]

I could listen to you guys for hours and hours. Great show.

[@Moggy471]

Absolutely fantastic video, enjoyable and informative. Can’t wait for the next instalment.

[@raynorris3079]

Loving all these short-ish clips, but is there a longer series onTV...?????

[@addyyyyg]

As an American, my favorite part of all these series is James & Al doing their intense American accents-“Gravy bridge,” “Willard,” etc.-literally never gets old😂

[@mwaythos]

This has been a terrific series. You are doing a great job letting *us* see the landscape. It's a very difficult thing to do. Also - lots of praise for Black Tuesday which I picked up at Al's signing in Cambridge the other weekend (had no idea you were going to be there so that was a bonus). I remain, like you, baffled by that basic planning error. Even on the maps it seems "obvious". Especially given Montgomery's constant mantra of both balance and overwhelming concentration.

[@maximumattackrallying]

Enjoying this videos. It's great to see two people who are genuinely passionate about the subject matter, and have clearly spent huge amounts of time studying the history. Fascinated to see which ground you cover next!

[@frances7243]

Nothing like walking the ground and, at the same time, discussing all the issues to get a feel for the fighting. Thanks

[@jasonmussett2129]

Great stuff, lads. After Arnhem, not too mention the Americans getting bogged down at Metz and the Hurtgen Forest, I think the Allies realised the Germans were no longer retreating.

[@davidrendall7195]

Couple of three things overlooked in this battle - yes it could have worked, more importantly it had to for the British end of the war to go smoothly, that it didn't came down to an error of judgement on Eisenhower's part. Montgomery was a European officer he knew the gap between the delta and the Ardennes was a graveyard of armies, a horrible place to fight and move. The island between Nijmegen and Arnhem being the soggiest and lowest part. He wanted to be over these watery features, choke points and raised roads and alongside the Dutch/German border before the Germans stuck up a defence. He didn't want to waste effort getting Antwerp's approaches because that's the single hardest feature in the Low countries, two British armies have come to grief in these tidal creeks. If he could make the Inland Sea in September, he could have had Rotterdam and Amsterdam open for business and then move into the delta east west along the rivers rather than across them south to north. Eisenhower was an American infantry officer raised on giant bland sandpit exercises in the midwest, he liked all his ducks in a row and all his forces engaged and moving forward together. You hear so much in US Officers memoirs about the Louisiana manoeuvres of 1941 where US Army planning and methodology got stuck in an 'everything, everywhere, all at once' mode. They had to fight over complicated ground like Europe and seem to have come up with a doctrine of 'uncomplicate it!' usually with massed manpower and firepower. The point at which Overlord turned into the charge across France happened suddenly. Chasing an enemy is hard, when do you charge when do you consolidate? when to grab with a battalion today what could take a division tomorrow? When to risk a corps that could be cut off beyond help because you got too giddy? Monty and Patton were charging the scent of blood. If they didn't have the Rhine as their minimum line of exploitation they were no student of European war. It's a physical and psychological barrier which would put the non-aquatic German Army on the horn of dilemma, there would be no large scale counter attack if the allies could make the western bank. German generals would have to forgo their classic return volley and just wait for the next shoe to drop. That's the minimum line of exploitation and a safe place to consolidate after a big chase - the Rhine. Except in the Northern British sector, that would just over the Rhine along the Ijssel and inland sea. The point at which overlord turned into a chase to the Rhine was also where Eisenhower took control of the ground battle. Monty had directed Overlord to the Seine, after that Bradley got his Army Group and they both charged ahead faster than anyone expected. Operation Comet was Monty's last attempt to supercharge his advance and get past the delta, over the Rhine and onto the German border. The Ruhr would be facing a pincer if Patton could likewise cross further south. Devers was already preparing a crossing way south next to Switzerland. This was all in movement in late August, when Eisenhower took personal command. The error of judgement was Eisenhower's choice of command post. At this critical junction of decision making - narrow front or broad front? chase or consolidate? Eisenhower was working out of a small farm in Normandy with virtually no telephone or radio communications, he had to send runners to nearby signals units to receive telephone calls, even the US official history calls it a terrible location to run a giant offensive. Eisenhower had flown forwards to meet Bradley and Monty and take over, no new orders were given and he ran out fuel on the way back. Already in poor health, Ike hurt his back landing among the dunes and pushing the aircraft out of danger. In this state of mind and body, with his incomplete battlefield picture and poor comms, Eisenhower made the decision to stop Monty, Patton and Devers and move everyone else forward all together, all at once. He would consolidate well BEFORE the Rhine and open the awkward delta to Antwerp before moving forward again. He also took the opportunity to straighten out the command chain and created the first allied air army under Lewis Bereton to take charge of all allied airborne operations. Op Comet turned into Op Market Garden - the original commando mission turned into a piecemeal assembly of a light infantry corps behind enemy lines for an advance to contact from distant landing zones. Coup de main forces were dropped, night landings were dropped, second and third day objectives took priority and reduced force on first day objectives. Market Garden failed to make it past the Rhine / Waal island. Monty never would get past the island, he had to squeeze 2nd Army through the heavily forested Kleeve and Wesse gap. The US Army had to battle for position among the Hurtgen forrest while Patton sat before strengthening German lines that hadn't been there the week before. Devers Army group was told to cancel their planned crossing of the upper Rhine, the western allies would do it all together, all at once, when they were ready. The Germans were helped off the horns and given a solid non-soggy springboard west of the Rhine to launch their counter attack. That's where Arnhem was lost, that's where the costly and horrible battles for Walcheren and Hutgen robbed the allies of all momentum and Germany got the opportunity to launch Watch on the Rhine. Half the casualties on the western front were avoidable if Eisenhower had been following events from a proper command post with a sense of the ground being covered.

[@jrd33]

Impressive analysis. Thank you.

[@nickdanger3802]

Eisenhower was responsible for all of NW Europe Montgomery was responsible for a strip of Channel coast

[@simonjohnson1585]

Definitely hook,line and sinkered on your wonderful informative series lads. That pint looked good as well 😊. Thank you for sharing and all the best from Somerset 👍🏻👍🏻🍺🍺💯✨

[@TheFightingCanuck]

I think like Jim and Al, I cant wait for Arnhem, but this series was excellent, the fighting in Nijmegen with the mixed force of Guards Armored and US Para's in such a large urban fight feels extremely overlooked. Glad they shared so much light on the subject. Walking the ground is one of the best series on WW2 coming out right now.

[@joshuahudson4982]

Amazing series gents! Its inspired me to plan and book a trip to Normandy for that first time, can’t wait!

[@paulpaterson1661]

At Site Hillman I met the team from a Dutch WW2 podcast called Radio Orange. Great chance meeting.

[@dustyscabbard5327]

My Granddad said he was actually here before as part of the scottish rifles now that part has never been confirmed but i beleived him as well i have the news paper clip and his words, "Joe Counter Started off in the Scottish rifles then became a Paratrooper". He and his men were cornered and hid in a brothel and this is his quote "Not for the woman, Just so that they could feed us before we could find a way out." Strange to think you could possibly sat roughly where he was hiding. Much love keep up the good work.

[@etissite]

Love these 2 and the information they provide . Keep up the great work. 🙂🙂

[@the-primered-thumb]

I think your perspective is totally valid,plus it's two knowledgable blokes ,having a pint 😉👍

[@Rampage_Driver]

I really like the way you guys have done this, it's a departure from the accepted norm of how information on the Second World War is delivered. The relaxed, informal nature and the enjoyment of two friends just exploring the sites is wonderful. As someone who has become obsessed with The Siege of Malta since reading James' book on it, I would love to see you do a series there.

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

Thank you so much for the kind words. We have a long list of places we'd love to walk, but it also helps to know where people watching would like to see as well.

[@markstott6689]

I truly hope that next spring you do more filming for the Rhine crossing and the advance into north western Germany. There's never anyone interested in the capture of Hamburg and the drive into Schleswig-Holstein. I'd love to see it. 😊😊❤❤😊😊

[@buonafortuna8928]

Good job guys. Beers looked good. A few snacks would have been nice. @09:38 Yep well said Al. My wife get fed up with me reading Al's book because I kept saying "Oh no" "Come on" , "No, oh FFS". Great job and everytime as James said I'm looking for them to make it this time.

[@markkirkby5377]

Fantastic series guys, absolutely love the way you guys walk the ground 👍👍

[@sbishop6450]

Absolutely great sceries of videos. So easy to understand and grasp what was going on. Lovely to hear about the Brits in WW2 Normandy and beyond too. I enjoy the American stuff but to have the Britts stuff too is helpful in getting the bigger picture. Thanks - keep it up!

[@wartsnall7332]

Paddy's ghost looks up from his pint of black, and mumbles, "We weren't fecking Brits, we were Limeys".

[@Gone_Postal33]

Loving this series. As an American we never really learned that much about Market Garden besides watching, A Bridge Too Far, in history class. So this is really filling in a lot of gaps. If you guys play any video games I'd recommend checking out Squad 44 which has ton of maps set in accurate recreations of the Market Garden battlefields.

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

Thank you for watching. - so glad you’re enjoying the series. Will check out Squad 44!

[@fabiotabaton314]

A pleasure to listen to you two...congratulations..really enjoyed!!! Ciao

[@TC-qd1zw]

How many times did they fill there glasses. That said great discussion and a great series.

[@brendanthornton1634]

Top job guys really loved the series..... what a great job to have

[@Bunny73]

Just binge watched the lot! Cracking job, keep it up, maybe Crete next?

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

@@Bunny73 We are off to The Bulge next Sir

[@RobJones262]

You guys are the best! Keep the vids coming ;)

[@richardnorris3095]

What a fantastic series this is guys , you both make it so fascinating to watch , keep it going 👍🏻👍🏻🙌🏻

[@martinwoolley821]

Thanks James & Al - great series. One question I'm not sure has been raised or answered is 'What if 82nd had been given Arnhem and the British Airborne targeted Nijmegen do you think ther ewould/could have been a different outcome? Would Frost had taken Nijmegen Bridge on the first day? Did the British have to be given Arnhem? Thanks again.

[@user-mc4sq3fk5d]

And I guess then that the better division commander-Gavin over Urqhuart- would have also held Arnhem in this scenario.

[@garryt6356]

Great videos! Keep them coming!

[@Kinolens]

Fantastic series and work gentlemen. I live in the Netherlands, and have visited Arnhem a couple of times. After watching your series i am tempted to go back and visit your finds! If you ever go back there’s a fantastic private museum, where all of the artifacts have been found in barns and the neighboring forests. Keep up and great work chaps.

[@williammyles]

Excellent channel so informative and interesting and respectful thank so much 😊for

[@TheBritishLegions]

This series has been thoroughly enjoyable. Way way better than I expected, & in that the vids work really well!

[@maxparker1928]

Hope you get the chance to cover Varsity in the same way. Fascinating to contrast what works there and how the lessons from Market Garden were used (if at all).

[@kevinhendon]

Great blog as usual Gent's, and a well deserved beer to ease the throat. Al's mike seemed a bit off today and sounded strange, not sure why.......or was it the Dutch lager 😉

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

We were having to work with back up equipment for this episode. But don't worry -- just a one-off!

[@kevinhendon]

@@WW2WalkingTheGround Thank you, that explains it.

[@fingers3239]

It's good to hear others have faith that Market Garden was a workable venture. A huge part of its failure has been skirted around on this series up to now i believe. Although you have alluded briefly, in patches, the role of the occupiers was more integral to the downfall of the plan. The allies reluctance to heed the warnings of Brian Urquhart and the others of the intelligence community was a huge faux pas on the part of those in key appointments.

[@davemac1197]

The problem with Brian Urquhart's account was that when Cornelius Ryan interviewed him in 1967 he did not have access to Browning's side of the story (who already passed away in 1965) or the aerial photo in question. At least the photo has been located (actually two overlapping prints to provide a steroscopic image) in a Dutch government archive in 2014 and studied by Dr Sebastian Ritchie of the RAF's Air Historical Branch for a booklet on the RAF website in 2016, and a second edition in 2019. A third edition is in the works with more data contributed to it. The analysis showed that the tanks were indeed obsolete models and not confirmation a 1944-Type panzer division was in the area. The unit has been identified as a Luftwaffe training unit, and the tanks were near Son on 17 September and failed to interfere with the landings of the 101st Airborne. The operation failed for other reasons not connected to the intelligence that Ryan's research either ignored or failed to unearth.

[@ianrobinson5839]

Hugely informative guys ... Just creating a series of joined wargames on market garden and this is valuable source material. And watching on armistice day ♥️

[@ianrobinson5839]

Guys check the 1943 US Army map of Nijmegen www.loc.gov/resource/g6000m.gct00040/?sp=37

[@f87max30]

Love this series. I hope you guys are coming to Bastogne later this year. As for Market-Garden, I've always felt it should have been combined with a 2 division amphibious landing somewehere n the north of Holland.

[@briancray1232]

Gen. Brereton made the decision of only 1 lift for day 1. Said his planes and crews could not handle 2 lifts in one day. All planning derived from that. To the plans detriment.

[@davemac1197]

It was General Paul Williams of US IX Troop Carrier Command and Brereton's 1st Allied Airborne Army Air Transport Commander that advised only one flight per day was feasible, because of the reduced daylight hours since the double airlift of Brereton's LINNET and LINNET II operations, but the decision to fly entirely in daylight was Brereton's and it was arbitary as being preferable to night flights, because it was a no-Moon period. The thing is that the RAF, and Browning, Dempsey, and Montgomery, wanted a hybrid solution of flying at night for the outbound leg of 1st lift and return leg of 2nd lift, which would allow for dawn and late afternoon deliveries, with several hours between the sorties to allow for maintenance to turn around the aircraft. Williams and Brereton refused appeals from Hollinghurst (RAF 38 Group) and David Belchem (21st Army Group GSO 1 Ops representing Montgomery) respectively, and BRereton would not chnge the air plan once it was set. 21st Army Group had not been notified of the 11 September plan until after Brereton's 12 September cut-off date for any further changes, so Brereton had ensured he had got his way on the planning. The motives are probably a lot to do with the fact that both Brereton and Williams had got their appointments to 1st Allied Airborne Army by Eisenhower charged with improving the USAAF Troops Carrier's navigation and drop accuracy performance after the Sicily and Normandy operations. To overrule this, Montgomery would probably have to appeal to Eisenhower, and he woud likely consult his deputy and air chief, Arthur Tedder, who was not well disposed towards Montgomery. If Eisenhower overruled Brereton, then Brereton still had the authority to simply cancel the operation, and if Eisenhower still wanted it to go ahead he would have to relieve Brereton of command. The conflicting interests were the USAAF's peformance versus the requirements of the airborne troops to be landed close to their targets and delivered as quickly as possible. At the end of the war, Brereton was the first to publish his diaries and claimed MARKET was a total success and GARDEN was not because the Second Army failed to move up to Arnhem as quickly as scheduled.

[@peterrose9886]

I’m quite sure that in one of the other 10 time lines in the universe, Market Garden WAS a success!

[@palerider67]

Fascinating stuff chaps. I have to agree with you, in so much as the more I have studied the circumstances of this Operation, the more I came to the conclusion that it was feasible to achieve the objectives, but for some unforeseen elements of bad luck and a couple of poor decisions. Every plan no matter how executed will start to unravel at the first engagement with the enemy…that is a fact of life., you just need the chips to fall your way which can be the difference between success and failure. This conceivably could have been the much sought after breakthrough for the push into the heart of the Reich. Monty was a man not without his failings, but I do feel he has been unfairly castigated for the failure of the Operation as a whole, when as we’ve seen from this series and continue to see that there is a hell of lot of nuance. The plan certainly had merit in my humble opinion.

[@PaulDouglasDouglas97]

Really good video mate can't wait for the next one

[@dougm5341]

Was able to many, many years ago to have a Market Garden Tour. Loved it very much.

[@ericUtr]

Al and James, halfway through a pint of Weizen, reaching for beercoasters to go in depth on the battle ....right at the old hunting ground of my student days..... what's not to love?

[@johnstimitz2629]

Absolutely loved this series. It still boggles my mind that Montgomery, or whoever made the decision, DID NOT tell Urqhart and Gavin about the location of the II SS Panzer Korps. They tell Gavin about a “forces” that may be in the Reichswald but NOT 6-8 miles north of him. Also, not telling Urqhart is criminal, if not just plain wrong. Plans could have been modified. British 1st Airborne may not have been split in three parts. Gavin moves quicker to the Rais Bridge., etc…

[@davemac1197]

Urquhart and Gavin were not cleared to know that II.SS-Panzerkorps had been identified by 'Ultra' code intercepts, because only Montgomery and Dempsey (2nd Army) were cleared to know that Ultra even existed. The main point is that Cornelius Ryan also didn't know about it when he published his book (A bridge Too Far) in the same year Ultra was declassified and made public in FW Winterbotham's book, The Ultra Secret (1974). Many authors have also followed Cornelius Ryan's narrative because it sells books in the huge US market. Montgomery cancelled the original Arnhem operation COMET on 10 September as a result of this intelligence and the still stiff resistance on 2nd Army's immediate front in the Belgian canal zone and the Dutch border. He realised 1st Airborne Division and the Polish Brigade landing at Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave were not strong enough to deal with the SS units (even in reduced condition from Normandy) and two divisions would be required in this area, and another division was needed to form a corridor between 2nd Army and Grave. When Gavin was told on the evening of 10 September his division was now to land at Nijmegen-Grave for operation MARKET, he went immediately to 1st Airborne Division HQ to see their latest intel and plans they had made for COMET, and saw the Dutch resistance reports on heavy armour in the Reichswald and SS troops in Nijmegen. By 13/14 September the Dutch had identified vehicle insignia for the Hohenstaufen Division (9.SS-Panzer-Division) near Arnhem, and it was presumed the troops in the Nijmegen area may be the 10.SS-Panzer-Division 'Frundsberg', but in fact they had gone to Ruurlo east of Arnhem, where the Dutch had identified Kasteel Ruurlo was a division headquarters - but not which division. The details could not be disseminated to lower formations because the Dutch reports could not be confirmed by other means, such as aerial reconnaissance, and the Ultra source had to be protected. The decision to concentrate 1st Airborne and the Poles at Arnhem was no doubt because of their strong anti-tank establishments, having 84 guns combined, and Model was assessed to have only 50-100 operational panzers in his entire Army Group B. In fact by a bizarre coincidence, his September returns listed exactly 84 operational panzers. The British anti-tank units (such as Major Arnold's 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery supporting 1st Parachute Brigade) were briefed to expect heavy armoured counter-attacks from the first day, and that may include Panther and Tiger tanks - this is code to expect a 1944-type panzer division and a Corps heavy tank battalion respectively, so although specifics and names were removed ("sanitised" in the Ultra vernacular) from the raw intel, it could be passed down on a very restricted need to know basis. Cornelius Ryan wrote that the presence of Bittrich's panzer troops came as a complete surprise to the British Airborne, but only in a sense of the specific identifications, and it also depended on who in 1st Airborne you talked to. In the correspondence between Cornelius Ryan and Gavin in the Cornelius Ryan Collection of his papers held at Ohio State University, there's a cover letter Gavin sent Ryan enclosing some papers by Dutch researcher Colonel TA Boeree, who had tracked the movements of the Hohenstaufen Division on its withdrawal from Belgium, crossing the Maas at Maastricht on 4 September and assembling near Sittard, before receiving orders on 7 September to withdraw to the north of Arnhem for refit. Its route went through Venlo, Gennep, Nijmegen and Arnhem, apparently making a stop in the Reichswald. Only now in 1966 did Gavin suddenly realise the source of the reports of armour in the Reichswald was the Hohenstaufen Division in transit to Arnhem. The real crime was Ryan not including this in his book and instead giving the impression there had been a complete breakdown in Montgomery's intelligence. The operation did not fail for reasons of intelligence, it was actually accurate as far as it went, but incomplete. What was surprising was the speed of II.SS-Panzerkorps' reaction to the landings, and this was because of two measures that Bittrich had underataken. First, he had the ren=mnants of the combat units in the two divisions formed into 'alarm companies' ready to move on an hour's notice. Second, he installed a direct phone line between his Kasteel Slangenburg headquarters and the nearby Luftwaffe FLUKO (air warning command centre) in Doetinchem and his HQ placed on the list of units to be alerted of any unusual air activity. He received a warning call from the FLUKO within half an hour of the airborne landings starting and his units were ready to move in another hour. By the time Model had evacuated his Oosterbeek headquarters and made his way to Bittrich's headquarters at Slangeburg, Bittrich already had his units moving in response and Model approved the orders he had given. This was what Montgomery meant when he wrote in his memoirs that he knew II.SS-Panzerkorps were there, but didn't know they could react so quickly. Your mind was successfully boggled by Cornelius Ryan, and few authors have since put the record straight, but I can recommend Swedish historian Christer Bergström's two volumes as the best update of Cornelius Ryan using unpublished documents and interviews in his own papers and also debunking the many myths in the Hollywood film. Sources: Letter James Gavin, 18 November 1966, box 101, folder 09: James Maurice Gavin page 48, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University. Arnhem 1944 - An Epic Battle Revisited vols 1 and 2, Christer Bergström (2019, 2020) The 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery At Arnhem: A-Z Troop volumes, Nigel Simpson, Secander Raisani, Philip Reinders, Geert Massen, Peter Vrolijk, Marcel Zwarts (2020-2022)

[@bofoenss8393]

Wonderful video as always. I think one of the major schools of thought of both US and British airborne planners is that you could not reuse a landing zone to either drops or gliders again once it had gliders on the ground. It would be too hazardous with the field plastered with wrecks and then yet another another armada of gliders coming in. The risk of accidents and potential loss rate of men and equipment in collisions would be too high. This is only the time you see a second combat lift being attempted. They had only done it on D Day in Normandy before this.on D Day, the afternoon/evening glider wave also used landing zones that had not previously been designated or used. Those were not technically meant to be opposed landings and the landing zones were supposed to already be under ground forces control. . It explains the landing zone further away at Arnhem, but not the failure of Nijmegen to centralise the zones for reinforcements. That for me is, as you say, a big failure. I think it was a school of thought that you had to have completely clear fields for every new wave. Otherwise the loss to accidents would be too high.high.

[@davemac1197]

I don't think that's correct. The Drop Zone 'X' at Arnhem was reused as Landing Zone 'X' for the second lift gliders, which forced the use of DZ 'Y' at Ginkel Heide for the 4th Parachute Brigade - there were no large zones around Wolfheze not already full of gliders. The 82nd Airborne second lift re-used DZs 'N' and 'T' as LZs 'N' and 'T', and the third lift for the 325th GIR re-used DZ 'O' at Overasselt. In the 101st Airborne area, the LZ 'W' was overlaid over the first lift DZs 'B' and 'C'.

[@iNireus]

This lager is strong, the chat is one pint off Ultra cypher strength😂 Love the whole series by the way

[@TheSpikehere]

Most of their strong beers aren't lagers, they are ales.

[@juliangreenwood528]

If anything, all of this highlights the importance of "Red Teaming" a plan. Asking the uncomfortable questions and testing your plan is vital. The responsibility of a commander is to not be fixed by ego (and let's face it there were plenty of egos in the mix). Rushing ahead without thinking that the Germans could muster the ability to respond was naive at best.

[@johnpeate4544]

They knew the Germans had the ability to respond. Thats why they used paratroopers.

[@scottmcardle1857]

Brilliant series 👏 Great knowledge bouncing off each other and 2 guys id love to sit and a beer with. Just to pick their brains.

[@jonathanellis1842]

Those of us born in late 60s early 70s it is fascinating the what if market garden had succeeded? The Soviets would have been beaten to Berlin, Cold War may not have happened in the form it did and our childhoods and early adulthood hood could have taken a different unknown path! This is what and why it holds so many what ifs.

[@MarkSmith-yi9jk]

“He’s not ‘Walking Jim Gavin’!” Love it! Would love to have a beer and chat with you two…. Perhaps over Belgian Beers?

[@johncerne8958]

Even if the XXX Corps crossed the Arnhem road bridge on schedule, I'm not sure that a decisive further advance would have been possible. The Arnhem spearhead would still need to get supplies from the beaches of Normandy and whatever units got across the lower Rhine would need to be supplied over a single bridge at Arnhem until more bridges could be captured/built. I think Eisenhower even made this point to Monty when he first saw the plan. Furthermore, getting supplies up Hell's Highway was very challenging. Supplying an army group on the other side of the Rhine at Arnhem would be tough. Maybe the more modest goal of cutting off the German 15th Army would have been achieved, which could have helped open the Scheldt estuary and make the port of Antwerp usable, but ending the war in '44 is hard to imagine, given the improved condition of the German Army, their shorter supply lines as they retreated, and the motivational boost of defending their homeland. Of course, if the German Army was about to collapse, as the Allies hoped, then maybe this "full-blooded thrust" would have worked. However, the German Army wasn't about to collapse, so even a successful Market-Garden probably would not have ended the war in '44. I'm puzzled and disappointed that historians don't talk about this more; am I missing something? I'm looking forward to hearing your views!

[@davedangelo533]

Good point. If the Allies had done better on D1 and D2 the Germans would have thrown more at them. Maybe that exacerbated the airborne leaders nervousness to stick their necks out. It seems they all plodded a bit here vs Normandy landings.

[@davemac1197]

"The Arnhem spearhead would still need to get supplies from the beaches of Normandy" - no, because the supplies required for British 2nd Army were supposed to be built up and stockpiled in Belgium before the operation began. On 11 September, Montgomery's administrative officer warned him that they would not be able to start the operation until 23 September, so Montgomery immediately cabled Eisenhower this information and he received a visit from Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, Bedell Smith, the next day promising everything he needed. Smith went back on his word (a misunderstanding of the meaning of "absolute priority" apparently) and Bradley's US 12th Army Group continued to receive supplies and he even split them to favour Patton's US 3rd Army to advance on Metz instead of Hodges' US 1st Army at Achen to support Montgomery's right flank. Only an Army Corps (Horrock's XXX Corps), not an Army Group, would be deployed north of the Rijn at Arnhem.

[@johnlucas8479]

@@davemac1197: You say no to the statement "The Arnhem spearhead would still need to get supplies from the beaches of Normandy" then claim that "Supplies were supposed to be built up in Belgium before the operation started" and where were the supplies coming from to form the stockpile. It was Normandy and Dieppe from the 7th of September so Johncerne8958 is correct in his statement.

[@johncerne8958]

@@davemac1197 Thanks for the detailed info on the supplies prioritization issues. I'm afraid that I was generalizing a bit in my statement, and am glad that you provided some more perspective and details. Thanks! I would have expected the allies to try to exploit a successful crossing the Rhine at Arnhem with more than just one corps, but if the plan was only to get XXX Corps across, do you think that they could have made much of an impact, like capture the Ruhr or race to Berlin (!) by themselves? I wonder if the crossing at the Rhine at Arnhem would have just led to a static "island war" in October-December where the allied salient crossed over the Rhine instead of just short of it?

[@davemac1197]

@@johncerne8958 - generalising is inevitable unless you get into the detail and write a long screed, which is why I tend to do that while hoping to keep it as short as possible! The logistics alone is a complex operation and while people are right to talk about the challenges, it was an important but overlooked point that Montgomery feared he would not have the necessary "administration" (using the British military term) by the target date of 17 September and wrote to Eisenhower it would be delayed to 23 or even 26 September. Every day the Allies delay, the Germans build stronger defence lines, so Montgomery was trying to get Eisenhower fully behind the operation. It seems that Bedell Smith and Bradley conspired to go back on the promise. On the deployment north of the Rijn at Arnhem, there are maps showing the planned arrangement and in words in the 21st Army Group orders. The best map I could find is on the Vrienden Airborne Museum website, on the Bibliotheek page, scroll down to the list of 'Maps / Topografische kaarten' and the fourth link labelled 'Het operatie plan Market Garden - kaart uit Battlefield tour Royal Engineers 1945' is the one that shows the intended deployments - XXX Corps divisions north of the Rijn, VIII Corps was to cover the right flank to Gennep and link with 82nd Airborne, and XII Corps as far as 's-Hertogenbosch and the river Maas. The map image is not very high res, but the Guards Armoured Division would deploy between Apeldoorn and the Ijsselmeer coast at Nunspeet. The 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division between Arnhem and Apeldoorn with forward brigades establishing deep bridgeheads over the Ijssel at Deventer and Zutphen, and the attached Dutch Prinses Irene Brigade would have the honour of liberating Apeldoorn and the Royal Palace at Het Loo. The 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division would deploy east of Arnhem with a bridgehead over the Ijssel at Doesburg. The 1st Airborne Division planned perimeter included the Polish Brigade sector in the east of Arnhem that also incorporated the Ijssel bridges at Westervoort. Note that none of the Ijssel bridges needed to to be taken intact, hence no airborne attacks in MARKET, as the completion of MARKET GARDEN would be followed by a pause in British 2nd Army operations to allow 1st Canadian Army to clear the Scheldt and US 1st Army to get through the Aachen gap and secure Rhine bridgeheads between Bonn and Cologne, so replacement Bailey bridges could be constructed during this period. It was Eisenhower's intention that when Antwerp was able to supply all the Allied armies for his broad front strategy, his next target was a double pincer envelopment of the Ruhr using British 2nd Army from the Ijssel bridgeheads in the north and US 1st Army from their Rhine crossings in the south. Another point worth mentioning is that to enable 43rd Division to make amphibious river assaults, they had one battalion in each of two brigades fully mobilised with DUKW trucks, in order to make assault crossings of the Ijssel in the event the bridges were blown at Deventer and Zutphen, and the follow-up battalions would cross in assault boats. The Division was also prepared to make river assaults over the Maas, Waal, or Rijn, if bridges were blown or held by the enemy, and one of these prepared plans (operation BASIL) was put on a warning order on 19 September for a two-brigade assault crossing of the Waal to take the Nijmegen bridges. This is where Gavin intervened to insist on using his own troops to make the assault, if XXX Corps could supply the boats, and it led to some confusion in sourcing the boats as it was assumed they would have to be brought up the corridor (instead of 43rd Division), while the Royal Engineers in Guards Armoured had 34 boats already in Nijmegen. The huge amount of bridging material also stockpiled from both British and Canadian units was also used to build additional bridges, such as at Nijmegen on the old ferry site between the road and rail bridges, to provide alternative crossings in the event the Germans took down the bridges. The rail bridge at Nijmegen was mined by Kriegsmarine commandos and a span dropped, while an aerial bomb blew a large hole in the road bridge deck that had to be spanned by a short section of Bailey equipment. A Bailey bridge at Grave was also built at the town's old ferry site. Two bridges at Arnhem were built by Canadian engineers after the 1945 liberation, as was a replacement for the demolished bridges at Westervoort - the Canadians had to assault the Ijssel from east to west using amphibious Buffalo and DUKW vehicles.

[@raymondwestland2512]

"In de Blauwe Hand' is probably the famous cafe in Nijmegen. Great place to be. I spent quite some evenings there when I studied in Nijmegen.

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

We love it there. James Holland's favourite place in Nijmegen. He was mortified on our last trip when we tried to take XXX Corp for a drink and it was closed.

[@raymondwestland2512]

@@WW2WalkingTheGround Well, seems James made up for that during your September trip. I thoroughly enjoy your video and podcast series 'Walking the ground'. And James is right, Dutch beer and ales tend to be a little stronger in the alcohol department. Cheers from the Arnhem/Nijmegen area!

[@davemac1197]

The resistance HQ in Nijmegen that 1st Battalion 508th was due to stop by on their way into town was a hotel on the corner of Molenstraat and Tweede Walstraat, which is now the Pinoccio pizza restaurant. I'm sure they could have had a beer with their pizza... Conveniently, the resistance HQ was just a few doors away from the old civil hospital building that was occupied by the headquarters of the German Ordnungspolizei for the entire Netherlands until they evacuated in a hurry on 17 September, now redeveloped as the Molenpoort shopping centre.

[@cameronsimpson-ld8nk]

Love these episodes guys

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

Thank you! Please spread the word!

[@Donotcomply1999]

These series are fantastic.. I hope you guys do more..please cover more theatres ✌️

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

Please do like, subscribe and spread the word! The bigger the community we can create here, the bigger the opportunity we have to do cover more ground which we would absolutely love to do. Thank you for watching!

[@dankorolyk5917]

Fascinating and entertaining episode

[@davidevans3822]

They were definitely a bit pissed there. I'm not imagining that am I?

[@mogster71]

That XXX corps arrived in Nijmegen 36 hours behind schedule is often stated, in the film, but in many books. How is that so when they left the start line in the afternoon of the 17th and arrived in Nijmegen on the morning of the 19th? The operation had only been in motion for 36 hrs, the 17th was day 0. What was the plan? To arrive in Nijmegen on the afternoon of the 18th? That would make XXX corps 12 hours late? If the plan was to arrive in Nijmegen no later than 48hrs from operation start then they were early? Maybe I’m missing something?

[@johnpeate4544]

They made up the time lost at Son and got to Nijmegen with a few hours in hand.

[@davemac1197]

It was hoped XXX Corps would be in Eindhoven at the end of D-Day, but this was not realistic after Williams (US IX Troop Carrier Command) rejected drop zones Browning had selected between Valkenswaard and Son to enable the bridges at Aalst-Eindhoven-Son to be taken quickly. Taylor notified Dempsey that Williams had objected to the drop zones south of the Wilhelmina canal at Son on the grounds of the Flak around Eindhoven. In light of what actually happened, with the Guards making their first night stop at Valkenswaard with an hour of daylight remaining, the Aalst bridge was only 4 kilometers beyond the town and the Guards were held up here most of D+1 by a battery of four 8.8cm Flak guns and a couple of StuG IIIG assault guns from schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 covering the bridge. Most of the day was wasted trying to find an alternative route and the Germans finally abandoned the guns in the afternoon after hearing that US paratroopers had entered the city of Eindhoven behind them. If these bridges had been in the hands of the US Airborne, then the linkup with XXX Corps would certainly have been effected on D-Day, and even in the worst case scenario of the Son bridge still being demolished, bridging equipment could have been brought up 24 hours earlier and the resumed advance to Nijmegen made 24 hours earlier, arriving at Nijmegen early on 18 September. The removal of these drop zones and another up the corridor for a brigade at Elst was the end of Browning's "airborne carpet" concept, with the Airborne divisions now being more isolated from each other. It's ironic that the phrase "airborne carpet" still made it into the script of the Hollywood film, which did not cast the characters responsible for compromising the planning and removing the key components of Browning's original plan.

[@philipmoores4094]

XXX Corps started at 14h30 (actually 14h35) on Sunday 17 September 1944. They reach Grave bridge around 10h00 on Tuesday 19 September 1944. By that time, 43.5 hours have passed, but they are allegedly 33 hours late? On that logic the plan was for XXX Corps to reach Grave at 01h00 on Monday 18 September, 10.5 hours after the operation started ! The Devils Birthday by Geoffrey Powell includes an unverified timetable plan showing XXX Corps reaching Grave at 12h00 on Monday 18 September, so on that (unverified) basis, they were 22 hours late at Grave. This timetable has Nijmegen reached at 18h00 on 18 September and Arnhem at 15h00 on 19 September. Were XXX Corps late? Yes, but by less than 24 hours.

[@davemac1197]

Further to my original reply, I've since read Peter Rostron's biography of Dempsey and discovered that Browning also had a drop zone selected for 1st Airborne to drop a third brigade (I presume 4th Parachute) at Elst, midway between Nijmegen and Arnhem. Without knowning the exact location or intent, I presume this was to secure the road and rail bridges over the Linge-Wettering drainage canal that bisects the 'island' between Nijmegen and Arnhem, and as an effective anti-tank ditch became the de facto front line in October after MARKET GARDEN had failed. Dempsey said that the removal of this drop zone and the distance of the other zones from their objectives were the main reasonsthe operation failed. The Elst drop zone was rejected by Brereton on the grounds of insufficient aircraft, despite the fact both Taylor and Gavin had all three of their Parachute Infantry Regiments dropped on D-day and both had at least one battalion each in reserve roles, possibly two, while Urquhart had no reserves at all until Phase 2. Brereton recycled his air plans for operations LINNET (Tournai) and LINNET II (Liège-Maastricht bridges) to create MARKET, and would not change the aircraft allocations to better suit the requirements and priorities of the airborne troops. Had Browning's "airborne carpet" concept been preserved and not thrown out by Brereton and Williams, it's entirely conceivable that XXX Corps could have reached Arnhem in 24 hours, even assuming the D-Day overnight stop at Son to replace the bridge as described in my previous answer was still required, because they would have a secured route all the way to Arnhem. It would also require the Nijmegen bridge to be taken on D-Day as Gavin intended, and I don't see any avoiding of Lindquist letting him down in this respect unless Gavin had assigned the Nijmegen mission to Eckman's 505th Regiment instead of the 508th. Ben Vandervoort's 2nd/505th Battalion was regarded as Gavin's best in the division and it was one of two battalions in the 82nd in a reserve role on D-Day, sitting on Hill 81.8 behind Gavin's command post at Groesbeek. It was later used in the assaults on Nijmegen on 19/20 September supported by the Grenadier Guards. Where many people may be getting the wrong impression about XXX Corps being behind schedule is the line "they're 36 hours behind skeduule" spoken by Elliot Gould (playing 'Bobby Stout') as the Guards crossed over the Son Bailey bridge (representing the 506th's Colonel Robert Sink, who was actually in Eindhoven at the time and had nothing to do with building the bridge). There was a 36 hour delay in the operation, but it wasn't at Son (which was bridged in 10 hours and 15 minutes during the hours of darkness - when it was doctrine not to advance tanks and therefore imposed no delay at all), it was at Nijmegen that 36 hours were required to fight through the city and take the bridges due to the failure to secure them on D-Day. Something that Cornelius Ryan did not research to avoid embarrassing his American friends, despite Gavin being quite open about Lindquist in his 1967 interview for A Bridge Too Far (box 101, folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection online). The other odd thing about the film script is that the phrase "airborne carpet" was used by Dirk Bogarde (as Browning) in the Corps briefing scene, despite the fact the actual concept had been thrown out by Brereton and Williams, who were not cast as characters in the film to ensure that only British characters were made known to the audience so they were blamed for all of the mistakes and failures.

[@mogster71]

Thanks for the detailed answers. I’ve come to similar conclusions around the lack of a drop zone on the “island” but had no evidence to back up the feeling. It’s suggested the RAF were willing to return for the 2nd lift on the 17th but the USAAF were not. Brereton vetoed the 2nd lift completely. Such a missed opportunity.

[@allanburt5250]

Excellent guys

[@ryanharris4964]

Love the series guys they are just the best. 👍

[@Retrotoyguysi]

The point of a high percentage beer is to drink it slowly and enjoy the taste, not just neck it 😂 General rule, if its hot and you are thirsty, dont go for the high percentage beer, this is more a Heineken/Amstel situation, chilling in the evening with your mates, one high percentage beer. Great video series to complement the podcast 😊

[@alistairwilson3084]

While all this was going on, the Allies weren’t clearing the approaches to Antwerp

[@davemac1197]

That is correct. While all this was going on, the Canadian 1st Army was repositioning itself around Antwerp in preparation to conducting operations to clear the Scheldt estuary. They were not ready to do it in mid-September, and even if they had been, there were not enough logistics to support a Rhine crossing and clear the Scheldt at the same time - it had to be done sequentially - and the most urgent operation was the Rhine crossing - before the Germans could fortify the river and canal defence lines. The Scheldt was already fortified and not going anywhere. Eisenhower was not the strategist that Montgomery was, but even he could see the logic of going for the Rhine first: _“I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations.”_ (Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life, Carlo D'Este, 2015)

[@John-h7l9e]

I have enjoyed these, despite factual errors. Keep going.

[@8020erwin]

was a good one again in the oldest pub from Nijmegen, up to Arnhem

[@The-Adders]

Al - when you do Cpt McKay RE, and his defence with Sappers at the north end of the bridge at Arnhem. Can I counter that with Cpt Briggs, with his defence of the east side of the north end of the bridge with RAOC-RE-Bde Sigs Platoon, under command of Lt Cairns R Sigs, who held for 3 Days. Especially his radio conversation with Frost which was pivotal to the action: as follows; Captain Briggs: The position is untenable. Can I have your permission to withdraw? Lieutenant-Colonel Frost: If it is untenable you may withdraw to your original position. Captain Briggs: Everything is comfortable. I am now going in with bayonets and grenades. Where he retook the position. Full disclosure - I speak as a former Scaly Back myself

[@brettcurtis5710]

Kia Ora from New Zealand - would love to see you two do Italy at some stage - the 2nd NZ Division slogged the whole length from the Sangro to Trieste - longest serving division in 8th Army - in at Alamein, still there at Trieste!! Monty made overtures to the NZ Govt about taking them to D-Day, as the 2nd Div had an armoured brigade,( making it a pocket Army) but the NZ PM stood firm, and he took Canadians instead, he liked Freyberg as one of his better Divisional commanders (but Freyberg also had the NZ Govt behind him with respect to Kiwi forces use - eg: Cassino) Oh and cheers for the Dutch beers - we get Heineken made under licence in bloody Auckland!! One of my finest friends is Dutch born Sept 16 in Eindhoven (but in 1964!) and he watched the movie being made as a teen!

[@johnord684]

Cracking stuff lads

[@robynduckworth4160]

Just wondering if you stayed for a second beer and carried on the conversation! Great series so far

[@douglaskillock3537]

Interesting to hear how modern assessments of the viability of the Market Garden plan are more amenable to it's chances of success. I grew uo reading about this stuff as a teenager in the 70's and it was generally judged doomed to fail. Although not representative of anything the old Avalon Hill game Storm Over Arnhem also made out that it was near impossible to succeed as the Allies. Of course we have the benefit of hindsight but once the initial pieces are on the board it's pretty obvious what the plan is. Must have been so for the German command too

[@GateXC]

Great series again - I think this one was even better than Normandy. One question I have for the guys - I wonder how much the waiting around for the 2nd drop issue would've been avoided had Browning not insisted on taking over 38 (or is it 35) gliders with his HQ? Seems to me that's a lot of the lift that would've been better purposed for frontline action and would have have been enough to overcome the "waiting for drop 2" inertia?

[@davemac1197]

The I Airborne Corps HQ flight consisted of 32 British Horsa and 6 US Waco gliders, towed by RAF 38 Group Stirlings and Albemarles respectively. This included 14 Horsas for the Corps staff, liaison, SAS, Jedburgh, and other minor units. The remainder of the Horsa allocation I don't have a manifest for, but I imagine it was for the Royal Signals staff, minus a radio section that had to be provided by the US XVIII Airborne Corps. The six Waco gliders carried US liasion officers from their two divisions and two teams from the USAAF 306th Fighter Control Squadron with VHF sets for contacting air support - these were the people with the wrong crystals for their radios due to the haste in forming the unit without proper training or testing - another two teams went to Arnhem. The British I Airborne Corps was not raised as a field Corps HQ but as an administrative GHQ for Airborne Forces lately converted into a Corps HQ, while US XVIII Corps had been an ordinary Army Corps HQ converted into Airborne by simply replacing the senior staff positions with Airborne personnel - notably Matthew Ridgway - the former commander of 82nd Airborne Division. Ridgway had no role in MARKET, but his Corps staff in England were used to coordindate the aerial resupply operations. Browning's decision to move the transport of his Corps HQ to Groesbeek from the originally planned second lift to the first lift was a consequence of decisions made beyond Browning's control: The first was Brereton and Williams' decision to conduct all flights for MARKET in daylight and this restricted the airlifts to one flight per day. This meant the second lift would no longer arrive in the afternoon or early evening of D-Day as Browning proposed, but was now due to arrive in the morning of D+1, unless delayed to the afternoon by weather, which became the case. The second was that this decision on daylight flights ruled out the planned dawn glider coup de main raids on the Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave bridges, conducted by D Companies of 2nd South Staffords, 7th KOSB, and 1st Border Regiment respectively in 18 gliders, as these raids were deemed too risky for broad daylight. Browning had deemed the raids as so essential that he cabled Dempsey (2nd Army) that the original Arnhem operation COMET should not go ahead without them. Browning sought to have alternative coup de main plans for these big bridges to be taken quickly in MARKET, and Urquhart's solution was to use his Reconnaissance Squadron Jeeps to rush to the bridge as quickly as possible. For Nijmegen, Gavin said in his interview with (A Bridge Too Far) author Cornelius Ryan that the British wanted him to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge, and while he toyed with the idea he said he eventually discarded it because of his experience in Sicily with a scattered drop and a division that was disorganised for days. It's interesting that for the Grave bridge, the highly experienced Colonel Reuben Tucker 'insisted' on a special drop zone for one Company to land south of the bridge so it could be taken from both ends, and he got it. All the evidence points to Browning being concerned about the Njmegen bridge and events proved him right to be concerned. I don't think it was 'ego' that drove his decision to take the Corps HQ there on the first lift, because it was originally scheduled to arrive there on the second lift. I think the main motive was his frustration at being unable to influence the planning once it was handed over to Brereton and Williams, and could only hope to influence events once he was on the ground in the Netherlands and wanted that to happen as quickly as possible. Browning had previously objected to a Brereton plan called LINNET II being scheduled too soon to print and distribute maps and Browning threatened to resign if it went ahead. Brereton had planned to accept Browning's resignation as his deputy and replace him with Matthew Ridgway and his US XVIII Airborne Corps for the operation, but LINNET II was fortunately cancelled and both men agreed to forget the incident. The point being that MARKET was out of Browning's hands and he knew what would happen if he objected to the plan. Montgomery's 21st Army Group was also not notified of the changes to the proposed plan that he had presented to Eisenhower for his approval on 10 September until after Brereton's 14 September cut-off date for any further amendments, so unless Eisenhower was prepared to dismiss Brereton and promote Browning to command 1st AAA, it was Brereton's show. As for units that were bumped by the late change to the glider schedule, I presumed for a long time, as many do, that the unit affected was the second half of the South Staffords Airlanding battalion going to Arnhem, because they required another 40 Horsas and a Hamilcar (41 tug aircraft), but since reading the recently published 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery Troop volumes by Nigel Simpson et al (2020-2022), it appears from these and the glider flight schedules in the Appendices of Peters and Buist (2009) that the bumped glider loads were the four guns of Z-Troop (Division HQ defence) and the second line ammunition trailers and Jeeps for the whole 1st Battery, and the Jeep transport for 1st Parachute Brigade. I had even studied what effect taking the whole of the South Staffords to Arnhem on the first lift would have and found it would make little difference, since Brigadier Hicks (standing in for the missing Urquhart) had decided to release the first half of the battalion from its Phase 1 task of protecting LZ 'S' early (they were Brigade reserve in Phase 2) and send them into Arnhem to reinforce 1st Parachute Brigade's efforts to reach the bridge, but by the time they arrived in the western outskirts of Arnhem the delayed second lift had landed and the other two companies had caught up with the battalion. An examination of the 1st Anti-Tank Battery's actions at Arnhem show that they did not lack for ammunition or guns, as German tanks were very wary of British anti-tank guns and avoided known sight lines. Some guns barely fired a round in the entire battle and at the bridge the only form of unexpended ammunition the Germans recovered after the seige was 6-pounder AT rounds - Frost was forced to surrender when they had run out of everything else. I'm convinced that if you're looking for the reasons the operation failed, the answers are not here, but I do think that the much maligned Browning was very concerned with and looking at the right area all along. Sources: Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967 (box 101 folder 10: James Maurice Gavin, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University) Glider Pilots At Arnhem, Mike Peters and Luuk Buist (2009) Arnhem: Myth and Reality: Airborne Warfare, Air Power and the Failure of Operation Market Garden, Sebastian Ritchie (2011, 2019) Little Sense Of Urgency - an operation Market Garden fact book, RG Poulussen (2014) The 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery At Arnhem: A-Z Troop volumes, Nigel Simpson, Secander Raisani, Philip Reinders, Geert Massen, Peter Vrolijk, Marcel Zwarts (2020-2022) Proposed Airborne Assaults in the Liberation of Europe, James Daly (2024)

[@chrisarnold4709]

Wot, no brewing up on this series yet? Was awaiting methods of instruction part 2 on hexi....😂 but a hugely impressive series and can't wait for 'der Hexenkessel' insights next. Just back from a weekend at Woodhall Spa where 1st Airlanding Brigade were billeted before the operation....sobering indeed how many left and never returned.

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

@@chrisarnold4709 We’ll hold our hands up and say, honestly, we had intended to brew up in this series. But we soon discovered that it was the end of camping season and there was not a gas canister to be had in any store. Airport security don’t seem keen on us bringing our own Hexis for some reason…

[@chrisarnold4709]

😂 hope you'll then youve re-enacted Alf Roullier's tin bath stew making on I think Sun 24th in Oosterbeek, something that just stood out for me in the book as so focused and normal in what must have been utter carnage - not a laughing matter at all but it would be a great you tube moment!

[@timborchers6303]

The two lift issue can be solved by flying the first lift to airfields in northern France on D-1. They could then do the first drop at 8 am after a short flight in good weather. The air could have returned to England in the clear weather and do a second lift to arrive around 4. They would need to stage fuel and maintenance to France for the overnight but that is not a big challenge.

[@theswedex]

Interestingly, James is a regular sipper and Al is an irregular gulper yet they pretty much finish a pint at the same time!!

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

Ha! Good observation skills. Thank you for watching!