18. Spence's Job Market Signaling Game: Solving for Separating Equilibrium (Game Theory Playlist 10)

In this episode I introduce a simplified version of the Spence's Job market signalling game and solve for a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium this signalling game.
It's crucial to watch lecture videos in the proper order to ensure effective learning. This is because the concepts in each video build upon those introduced in previous videos. To help you with this, I recommend visiting my website, www.selcukozyurt.com, for a recommended course outline.

[@Georgeyeaaaa]

Thank you professor for these in depth tutorials and for sharing your knowledge on this platform.

[@alberlinedejardin400]

Thanks teacher. I'm a student at Quisqueya University in Haiti.

[@burcuozcan6113]

Hocam öncelikle ders anlatımlarınız için çok teşekkür ederim. Gerçekten özümseyerek anlıyorum sayenizde. Hocam, ODTÜ’de PhD yapıyorum, şu an preliminary exam a hazırlanıyorum. Sizin için mümkün olursa, “Principal-agent problem” ve “incomplete information bargaining game” konularını da anlatmanız mümkün olur mu? Çok memnun olurum. Çok teşekkür ederim. İyi çalışmalar dilerim.

[@ehsanmohaghegh9960]

Hi Professor Can strictly dominated strategy be part of Weak Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium? (for off the equilibrium path). Thanks in advance. Ehsan- PhD student of Economics at Syracuse University.

[@rightquestions8870]

i don't think so

[@Tatiana-zs3dc]

No.

[@matheuscostadopatrocinio584]

Thank you Professor