Historian REACTS to our Grouchy at Waterloo video!

We had alot of fun in Belgium creating our Grouchy Marches to the Sound of the Guns video...and it generated some discussion. Historians on X (aka twitter) even started a thread...so we decided to ask one of them to respond to what we did. What was on target and what was off-base. Charles Esdaile, historian and author on several books about the Battle of Waterloo joins us and has at it!
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[@LittleWarsTV]

Really enjoyed hearing a qualified expert weigh in on this question! Nicely done gents. Your Waterloo coverage has been great so far

[@green6horn]

Yes, Charles is solid on Waterloo and Peninsular War focuses and does a terrific job on the Napoleonic Quarterly podcast.

[@Warui88]

Gotta feel bad for Grouchy. The man is shouldered with a good chunk of the blame for Waterloo despite Napoleon's own blunders during the battle.

[@johannesmuther2599]

...and during the days before...

[@currybr]

You guys are putting consistently great content. Little Wars better watch out.

[@LittleWarsTV]

Right!

[@TankerBricks]

Very good to hear the feedback! Might I add that Gneisenau ordered the furthest Corps to march followed by the next and the next, leaving the Corps closest to Wellington practically last to set off despite being the closest.

[@isidroramos1073]

In all fairness it was the closest but had suffered many losses while the furthest was fresh, hadn't fought at Ligny at all... still I don't think I would have done that myself, but there was a logical reason for Gneisenau to do what he did.

[@johannesmuther2599]

Im pretty sure that most of the losses on the 16th were from I. and II. Corps. III. was pinned down by french cavalry

[@isidroramos1073]

@@johannesmuther2599 My understanding is that during June 16th and 17th the Prussian I and II Corps were the closest to Wellington, III and IV being east of them until the whole army converged on Wavre - even then I and II were west of the river, III and IV east. June 18th IV Corps took the vanguard marching to Waterloo, followed by the I and II, but not one after another. I Corps would arrive north, roughly at the Allied lines, II to the south, towards Plancenoit. It makes a lot of sense, actually. Until the army concentrated at Wavre I and II Corps, badly hit, were among the Allied and the rest of the Prussian army, both flanks covered. Come June 18th the fresh IV Corps takes the lead and III Corps is left last in case a French force appears.

[@johannesmuther2599]

@@isidroramos1073 You're dead right mate

[@anathardayaldar]

OMG my question was asked first! I've never felt so honored to be wrong. :D

[@theobessiris9681]

I absolutely enjoyed your series on Waterloo. I hope you intend to cover more Napoleonic battles in a similar style.

[@radboudmuurmans]

The problem here is as always we have 20 - 20 hindsight. The track records of Napoleon and Grouchy make it unfair to judge too hard on either one. It must be said however that during the entirety of Napoleon's tenure as commander of the french forces he had to deal with a declining quality of troops, his generals and commanders becoming battle weary and falling away due to casualties. In addition Napoleon in his latter en especially in his last (read the Waterloo campaign) relied on his reputation more and more. As an aside, Napoleon had not faced the combination of commanders he was currently facing. In addition and I quote Wellington here :" the nearest-run thing you ever saw in your life."

[@stephenbarker7793]

Fantastic video. Great to hear Charles' views. So important to understand the lie of the land at the time of a battle.

[@ilsagutrune2372]

IV corp’s cavalry and 1 division from the I cavalry corps were at Waterloo… this left Grouchy with only 3 regiments of light cavalry… the rest of his cavalry was dragoons

[@Edgy62]

He's a hundred percent right, Napoleon had already lost by the time the Prussians arrived at Waterloo. In my opinion the only difference Grouchy could have made was if he'd been with Napoleon AT Waterloo at the start of the battle, instead of being on a wild goose chase following the Prussians. All of the mistakes that lost the French the battle of Waterloo were made before, but mostly during, the battle itself.

[@Kamfrenchie]

you mean he lost when the prussians arrived ?

[@gerhardris]

Great analysis. Indeed, Napoleon made the mistakes. Untill a year or so ago I thought that Grouchy also cost Napoleon the campagne by not marching towards the guns. However, if I take the orders given to Grouchy in the excellent but not accurate film Waterloo as a fact the Grouchy was given the main order not to have Blucher meet up with Wellington. So, Grouchy should also have studied the map and see that the river Dyle was the main obstical to do this. He should have got back to Napoleon and suggest to march up the West side knowing that Wellington was in Brussels. Anyway, Napoleon should have stayed in Paris and not Davout who should have been leading the army. Napoleon had taken the potion to commit suicide after his first forced abdication. No doubt arsenic made for him after a Tarter nearly killed him in Russia. Napoleon left the field due to stomach problems. Ergo, he wasn't at his nest. He most probably died on St Hellens due to this arsenic that had lost its potentcy and Waterloo. Thus the campagne to be warhamed out is Davout/ Napoleon giving the correct orders aftsr Ligny. Have a detachmsnt of cavalry stay in contact with Blucher on the East side and march hell for leather on Brussels with Grouchy allso as bait on the West of the Dyle at the double guick. Ergo try to keep both Wellington and Blucher guessing where the main body of the French army is. Striming to finish off Blucher or string against Wellington i.e. Brussels. Up the main road.

[@martinknight1000]

As to the Prussians I'm afraid he's missing the fact Blucher would not let his LOS be intercepted and would have defended it strongly. easy to over look supply lines.

[@maxburns9278]

Is there a book out there that has all the available correspondence and orders issued by all armies translated to English? One of the most interesting things I have read and I believe it comes from Cornwall’a Waterloo book was the D’Erlon’s attack was supposed to start from the right in echelon to the left but Ney scribbled on the order to start from the left. It makes me wonder if Ney knew at that time the Prussians were coming and he wanted to keep the right flank anchored? Another thing I find interesting is the aide? that scouted the Prussian advance and recommended to defend the edge of the wood where the Prussians would have been stuck downhill in forest. Washington that really recommended and if the French did defend there would it have made a difference?

[@crownprincesebastianjohano7069]

That Waterloo even happened is a product of the real failure in the campaign for Napoleon. He absolutely needed to destroy the Prussian Army at Ligny. It was Prussia's primary field army led by her best Marshal. The hinge of fate rested on the shoulders of the Comte D'Erlon. Had Napoleon succeeded and getting a corps astride the Prussian line of retreat (D'Erlon), he would have ended up not only surrounding 2/3s of the Prussian forces, but would have captured Blucher himself, who was pinned beneath a horse for hours. The destruction of the Prussian army would have had the immediate impact of convincing Wellington of the need to evacuate his army, and the greater political impact on Prussia. Losing its primary field army, and best commander could have had a decisive influence on the weak-minded Frederich Wilhelm III. Napoleon would have pursued Wellington with his full force and a battle would likely have resulted in a moderate victory for the French and Wellington running to his ships. The destruction of the primary Prussian field army, capture of Blucher and the departure of Wellington and his army, along with the subsequent reoccupation of Holland, would have went over like a bombshell in Vienna. It *might* have been enough to convince Alexander, Francis and FW to accept a peace based on the Status Quo Ante Bellum. At the very least, it frees up Napoleon to move most of the Army of the North, along with the reinforcements gathered at Paris, to the eastern frontier for a showdown with Schwartzenberg and the primary Coalition Army on acceptable numerical terms. Along the way Napoleon could have worked out the kinks with Soult as Chief of Staff, or perhaps change his mind and bringing Davout with him to command one of the army's wings, and install someone else at Defense Minister. Frankly, at that point the odds are pretty good Napoleon beats up on the Austrians and Russians. Who knows after that. It's one thing to say "No Peace with Napoleon!" It is another to look down the barrel of some years more of war after Napoleon just dispensed with the armies of 2/4 major Coalition partners when he professes to want nothing more than peace and the current borders.

[@johannesmuther2599]

Thats a lot of 'if's'

[@Kamfrenchie]

lots of things could have gone differently., agreed, but this was still a longshot

[@bigsarge2085]

Happy New Year and great 2023!

[@green6horn]

Charles is an excellent choice for this commentary. Well done, Mark. Glad you did this.

[@waltleach8880]

Great discussion I really enjoyed it. I also like how you insert maps and pictures into the video.

[@redlancer4128]

That was a great presentation.

[@kissmy_butt1302]

The campaign was lost at the twin battles of Ligny/Quatra Bras. 1) When D'Orleans corp got caught between Ney and Napoleon's orders and didn't impact either battle field. If he ended up following Napoleon's orders the odds are they give a bigger beating to the Prussians because they would have fell on their right flank. 2) When the French cavalierly overran Blucher who was trapped under his horse. The Prussians would have pulled back and not supported Wellington.

[@johannesmuther2599]

Agree with your first point, not quite so with the 2nd. Yes, Gneisenau disliked Wellington (for good reasons i might add) but he was the one to decide to fall back north and not east which would have been the much more natural route. For my unverstanden tjis was made to keep contact with the allies.

[@green6horn]

It’s D’Erlon’s Corps for starters. The mistake was not pursuing The Prussians immediately after Ligny. Napoleon let them slip away and gave Grouchy a fool’s errand. Ney calling back D’Erlon didn’t help either.

[@joehudgens7330]

Nicely done!

[@jake4753]

great interview.

[@TWOM27]

Great debate. Excellent video.

[@gregoryhawkins4210]

I believe that if Napoleon had tried to not smash the center of Wellington and chose to flank him on either flank, (also had Davout with him instead of Ney, but he lost trust of Ney, so I believe he kept Ney close, however Ney instead of Davout was a mistake), he might have had a better ending as well as attacking earlier than 1130-1150ish like 9ish might have also helped. It's fun to speculate, but I really just feel that fate was not going to let Napoleon win even in what if's, because he did not decivively deal with Blucher himself and underestimated Blucher's hatred for Napoleon.

[@MourningConstitution]

Thanks!

[@StuartKoehl]

Grouchy's main shortcoming was a lack of imagination and initiative, which rendered him unfit for independent (or semi-independent command); in short, he should never have been elevated to the Marshalate. One wonders what would have happened had, e.g., Davout been given charge of the right wing of the Armed du Nord (and maybe Soult command of the left wing in place of Ney). Once Grouchy realized he had lost track of the Prussian main body, he should have marched immediately towards Belle Alliance, in order to interpose his force between Blucher and Napoleon. In fact, he could (and should) have been on the march before Blucher even got started, sending his cavalry on ahead to force the Prussians to deploy--and thus lose time. Grouchy's infantry, if it could not get ahead of Blucher, could at least have engaged in a running fight that would have cost more time. Delaying Blucher's arrival by even an hour could easily have swung the battle in Napoleon's favor.

[@jefffrazier5348]

Thanks you, I am thoroughly enjoying your channel and its content. Can anyone direct me to the actual written text of Napoleon/Soult 17 June order to Grouchy re: the Prussians? Is it as precise and peremptory as the author references? Or is it ambiguous such as Lee’s orders to Ewell on 1 July, 1863. Thanks

[@BillsWargameWorld]

Very nice

[@emilegrenierrobillard372]

I would really want your take on how napoléon could have won at waterloo and the aftermath of it. I think it would have strengtened his political position and allowed him a 1814 rematch but With way more ressources and a certain return of the revolutionary spirit.

[@JayvH]

Thanks for another great video. I'd like to hear some speculation on a what if scenario where Davout is not left in Paris as a minister of war but is joining the campaign and is either the commander of the left wing instead of Ney or is following the Prussians after Ligny. I suspect he would've shown a better performance.

[@kirishima2370]

I read, back in my student days (30 years ago) that Davout was kept behind in Paris to organise the Army for the coming campaign(s) but also because he was suffering badly with kidney stones and riding was extremely uncomfortable. He was probably Napoleon's best remaining general so who knows what he could have done at Waterloo, I expect that he would have avoided some of Ney's desperate blunders.

[@JayvH]

@@kirishima2370 Thank you for your input. I have read a biography about Davout a few years ago and just looked it up again. Napoleon wanted Davout as minister of war while Davout asked for a field commando. There is no mentioning of kidney stones. The part about the hundred days is very short though. I only know of Marshal Mortier who couldn't take part in the campaign as commander of the imperial guard because of Sciatica.

[@Darthvegeta8000]

@@JayvH from what i recall there was a risk of a monarchies uprising. Nappy needed a good general at hand to deal with it. Not sure he still trusted Ney enough to leave him behind so soon.

[@scottjuhnke6825]

2nd, and 3rd Divisions (I Corps) form up in battalion column of divisions, instead of divisional column, they sweep the allied left, and center from the battlefield. Without those 16 battalions, which never reformed, having been shattered by the English Cavalry. Grouchy could not have saved Napoleon. The Prussian IV Corps would have been harrying his right, and rear.

[@raka522]

It wasn't necessarily Napoleon's fault that Grouchy went in the wrong direction at first, because there were actually Prussian deserters who originally came from the Rhine Confederation states that were allied with Napoleon and who were heading towards the Rhine and whom he pursued first. Where and how should Grouchy have marched to intercept the Prussians or join Napoleon? It had been raining for days and it was very difficult for the Prussians to approach Waterloo on the two 'roads' and it would have taken Grouchy much longer across the fields and fields and if he was unlucky he would suddenly have had Thielmann's corps at his back...

[@e-4airman124]

so what if Grouchy was never sent at all and was at the battle the whole day?

[@ilsagutrune2372]

Then Blucher would have been there as well…

[@lucacapata583]

Fantasy Waterloo? Davout at the place of Grouchy.

[@johannesmuther2599]

Thanks for the video. It strenghtens my preexisting conviction. Grouchy was out of range to have an influence on the battle. The major mistakes were made on the 16./17. Cheers from the rhineland

[@kentnilsson465]

Regarding the question in the end, would it have been possible for Grouchy to question the order? Like, isnt it better if I veer to the right but still keep close enough to come if there is a battle? Or is that just something that you didnt do?

[@winterfell_forever]

No. The main problem here is that Grouchy started the pursuit later, cause Napoleon in one of his rare acts of overconfidence spent half a day pointlessly reconnoitring the Ligny battlefield and talking about his political problems back in Paris. And when Grouchy did started, he went East, following what he believed was a Prussian rearguard, but in fact were some 6000/10.000 saxons and other Rhinelanders who in fact were literally deserting. When he realised that, the whole Prussian army was nearly a whole days march ahead of him. If on the other hand, Napoleon hadnt wasted his time, and turned immediatedly on Wellington, he could ve reached Quatre Bras almost at the same time the news of Bluchers defeat got to Wellington (more or less past noon of the 17th). The "battle of Waterloo" would ve been fought 24 hours earlier, without the fucking rain fucking everything, in a battlefield not chosen by Wellington, and without reinforcements to the British...

[@isidroramos1073]

Napoleonic corps and army commanders were left with a lot of initiative to change what they were doing in spite of their orders, communications being so slow and insecure meant circumstances could change and the top commander wouldn't know for many hours, perhaps days, and his new orders would again take too long to arrive. This doesn't mean such a step was taken lightly, disobeying your orders could gain you a marshal's baton and a duchy, but also end your career if Napoleon was displeased with you... but the opposite was also true, for example, Bernadotte career started to go downhill in 1806 after he decided to obey Napoleon's orders rather than disregard them and march in Davout's help!

[@Kamfrenchie]

@@winterfell_forever doesn't seem like that leaves a lot of time to rest though

[@winterfell_forever]

@@Kamfrenchie Yeah, but in the end, they didnt "rest" either, actually. They walked all afternoon and had to sleep in the torrential rain, which sounds lovely. No rest also means no rest to Wellingtons forces, and Napoleon had 2 corps, D'Erlon's and Lobau's, which hadnt fired a shot yet (roughly 30.000 men), so that was a big advantage.

[@thomasmain5986]

Would have helped if Reille had not chewed up the 2nd Corp trying to take Hougomont, losing some seven thousand men. Or that D'erlons 1st Corp had attacked in deployable formation's rather than advancing as a meatwave subject to Allied artillery and finally cavalry losing some five thousand men in prisoners alone. All of this could have been controlled by Napoleon, but the Napoleon of old was absent, his control of the battle was almost non existent. Mass cavalry charges against unbroken squares. Only the French artillery kept them in the battle.

[@petergibson2035]

Napoleon’s greatest mistake was not having Davout as his battlefield commander. Davout would not have spent all day attacking the farmhouses. He would have tried to outflank Wellington. He would not have held back D’Erlon at Ligny. Perhaps Napoleon would have lost the war but the outcome of Waterloo could have been different.

[@Darthvegeta8000]

France was not yet stabilised. In case of a monarchist uprising he needed Davout. He may not have trusted Ney alone in Paris. You are right though with hindsight Davout would have been better especially if true if Ney was potentially suffering from ptsd.

[@Darthvegeta8000]

Nappy's overall strategy was good. But he seemed to loose his edge as the campaign went on. Be it bad health, weather, misfortune or just how the puzzle came together, not having decisive victory at Ligny seems to have sealed the deal. The Prussians vigor compared with Wellington's eye for defense sealed the deal. Nonetheless the battle of Waterloo is a rather uncreative affaire of a former genius showing none of his past energy and creativity facing a competent but not active Wellington and a brave old fanatic winning purely on oomf. A slogging match between atrophied giants. And yet still fascinating.

[@Timrath]

Ziethen is pronounced Tsee-ten.

[@winterfell_forever]

I think that the whole thing about Grouchy is pointless to argue, he did what anybody with his capacity could have done. A more decisive General would have certainly run towards the guns, and arrived late, or not early enough to prevent Bullows corps to arrive at Waterloo (a corps that hadnt participated in Ligny, and therefore was fresh). On the other hand, if Napoleon hadnt wasted his time on the morning of the 17th, and turned immediatedly on Wellington, he could ve reached Quatre Bras almost at the same time the news of Bluchers defeat got to Wellington (more or less past noon of the 17th). The "battle of Waterloo" would ve been fought 24 hours earlier, without the fucking rain fucking everything, in a battlefield not chosen by Wellington, and without reinforcements to the British...

[@pauls064]

I’m a little skeptical if experts who’ve never learned the pronunciation of the key subjects they study… the yanks can’t seem to pronounce Grouchy and the manx can’t pronounce Ziethen

[@JohnDouglasist]

Apologies - I don’t mean to add to the negativity already going around the internet - but your comment rather tells me you have no idea who Professor Charles Esdaile is. As for the yank who can’t spell Grouchy (which indeed he can’t - come on Mark!) he is a fellow wargamer taking the time and effort to produce content which is not only engaging but also backed by authorities in the field, rather than adding to the noise. Let’s chill a bit, and happy 2024 🙂👍

[@karlheinzvonkroemann2217]

"Wargaming" and "miniatures' seem to me to be two totally differently things. I "wargamed" to use my definition, Waterloo, a few times. The actual battle and the campaign, both fought on tabletop maps representing each military unit with chits, and on a Computer which takes the maps and units into the computer and adjusts movement, combat and combat based that's based on terrain and weather effects, morale, and unit strengths in real time. This is all done better in real time when multiple things are affecting movement, combat, morale recovery an multiple variables like leadership, troop quality, unit's rest status and health and unitand health. Computers are simply made for these multiple unit calculations affecting a single, multiple or single units involved in a multi-combat scenario which can be more realistically done with a computer than it can with charts and multiple rolls of the dice. Wargamers want realism and playability but often get neither :) There is no way around that.

[@blacbraun]

This guy has published and sold several books. You'd think he could afford a dentist.

[@chrisready9254]

Grouchys orders were to stop the Prussians joining up with Wellington... The fact he was miles behind the Prussians is irrelevent. Plus he ignored the sounds of the guns This expert is ignoring those two facts