The War Against Ukraine After Two Years

This February, the war against Ukraine enters its third year. After two years of hard conflict the battlelines appear increasingly static, with Kyiv’s summer and autumn counteroffensive having failed to meet many in the West’s high (if unrealistic) expectations. While the United States’ Congress debates over continued funding for Ukraine, the European Union looks set to approve a large-scale package of support for Kyiv. Russia, in turn, is spending greater amounts of state resources on defense, keeping its own economy afloat through Keynesian economics. The recognition that the war will be much longer than anticipated appears to be spreading, but the commensurate policy actions still appear lagging.
What does the year ahead hold for Ukraine? Will it be a year of “active defense” and force reconstitution for Ukraine or will Kyiv go on the offense? Will political uncertainty in the United States undermine Kyiv’s planning? Will Europe be in a position to fill any gaps left by America? What does Ukraine need for its defense today and offense tomorrow? What lessons can we draw from Ukrainian and Russian adaptation? What does each tell us about the course of the conflict? Perhaps most importantly, what is a viable theory of victory for Ukraine?
Lt. Gen. David Barno, Dr. Nora Bensahel, and Michael Kofman join CSPC to discuss these questions, and many more, and to reflect on the war after two years and what the year ahead holds for Kyiv. They will be in conversation with Joshua C. Huminski, the Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence and Global Affairs.

[@user-yi9vs4je9k]

Excellent discussion.

[@michaelthayer5351]

I've said many times and in many places that this war reminds me a lot of the Civil War, where the numerically smaller and industrially weaker side performed well above expectations due to their willingness to fight and turned what everyone thought would be a short easy war into a years-long slog. But in the end the Confederacy was ground down by the Union's Industrial and Manpower advantages and the only hope for victory became breaking Union will. Ukraine likewise can only really win if it can convince the Russians to give up, and the main factor in this war, much more important than Western support, is Russian willingness to keep fighting.

[@lucabu9838]

Sure, but all wars are driven by will and capacity. In this case you could also say that the "collective west" clearly has the industrial capacity to outproduce Russia. Also, given Russia's reluctance to conduct full scale mobilization their manpower advantage is still manageable for the Ukrainians if they are willing to mobilize those under 28. I agree the only way for Ukraine to win is to break Russia's will to fight, which just makes the refusal of western leaders to allow Ukraine to target domestic Russian economic targets like refineries and ports more insane. Even if Ukraine took back all their territory the war will never end until Ukraine can impose costs on Russia by striking Moscow, St Petersburg, and Oil. (given Ukrainian drones have been able to hit these targets I have no doubt that western cruise and ballistic missiles would also be able to)

[@michaelthayer5351]

@@lucabu9838 Striking Russia directly, especially with Western weapons is foolish in the extreme. The Russians have not fully mobilized because they cannot without risking the regime, they are trying to shield society from the war and in exchange the people acquiesce to the war's continuing. Most Russians are fence-sitters, but if you kill them on their own land they'll quickly stop being passively apathetic and instead become vengeful. While the West absolutely could outproduce Russia there has been great reluctance to do so as there is no way to do that without the average citizen feeling some kind of pain. And while the average person in the West is willing to give lip service support the democratically elected politicians are nervous about testing if that means they'll pay 2% more taxes or the like to pay for it. Ukraine mobilizing those under 28 though risks destroying the country long term if that already small age bracket is depleted in an attritional slog. Ukrainian civil society and her national unity risk fraying over the issue of mobilization, particularly of WHO is mobilized.

[@yp77738yp77739]

@@lucabu9838why do you say clearly has the capacity to outproduce? When the opposite has clearly been the reality, we’ve started an unnecessary fight that we can’t win and that’s not a smart thing to have done.

[@lucabu9838]

@@yp77738yp77739The EU alone has an economy 10x Russia's. Sadly, they waited a year before ramping up production whereas Russia did so immediately. It is for this reason that Ukraine will be forced to be on the defensive this year. However, Russian ammunition production has plateaud, according to Russian officials, at around 3 million shells a year and by the end of 2024 the west will produce more than that. Further, Russian vehicle and artillery "production" mainly consists of refurbishment of soviet equipment. Check the channel covert cabal to see that this can not go on forever.

[@looinrims]

@@yp77738yp77739Russia started the war, if you missed that

[@Moonbeamblue]

For those who are here for Kofman: 02:49 Where do we stand today? 11:36 Survival Magazine Piece, Attrition Doctrine for Ukraine. 23:17 Innovation, Adaptation, and Industrial Capacity. 32:20 Effectiveness of Drones, Technology on the Battlefield. 38:46 Taking out the Kerch Bridge, Threat to Russian Positions in Crimea. 45:24 Replacement of Zaluzhniy with Syrskiy. 53:45 Lessons learned so far. 1:01:05 - Theory of Victory for Ukraine.

[@NoHairMan]

Thank you.

[@talesofcanterbury42]

The Russians have massively underperformed in this War a few things need to happen: 1, the supply of weapons to Ukraine needs to be speeded up and extended; 2, those weapons need to be used against targets in Russia; 3, Ukraine needs to mobilise more troops; 4, the West needs to train those troops better and listen to their feedback, not just spout NATO doctrine; 5, we need to close the sanctions net so tight it now hurts

[@disappointedenglishman98]

Why should we arm the Ukraine? Russia is the ultimate guarantee to Britain that Germany will not take over Europe in the future. Britain is not thinking strategically at all. German military spending has now overtaken Britain. This will go wrong for Britain because of idiots like Tales of Canterbury42.

[@FrancoisMouton-iu7jt]

Sanctions have only backfired whilst the Russian economy is growing and the West does not have the ammunition required by Ukraine.Russia produces 3× the ammunition of the US and Europe combined.

[@talesofcanterbury42]

@@FrancoisMouton-iu7jt Sanctions need to be tightened and secondary sanctions need to be imposed. Russian economy is not great and we’ll sort the ammo

[@FrancoisMouton-iu7jt]

@@talesofcanterbury42 you obviously have a very limited understanding of international trade. Since the US abandoned it"s manufactering base it's sanction policy has become toothless.

[@talesofcanterbury42]

@@FrancoisMouton-iu7jt just one example is airlines. No space parts mean more accidents. These things take time.

[@FrancoisMouton-iu7jt]

Nobody here mentions Russia vast air superiority which is increasingly being implemented. Ukraine is also running out of manpower in what is mainly an attritional, not territorial battle by Russia.

[@fyhgb9325]

Glory to Ukraine!! Slava Ukraini!!!