Four British WWII Battalions Destroyed in the Streets of Arnhem | With Al Murray & James Holland

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

Hello! If you are enjoying walking the ground of Operation Market Garden with Jim and Al, please do LIKE the videos and SUBSCRIBE to our channel to show your support. Growing our KZbin community will enable us to walk more ground and make more films. Thank you for watching!

[@robertmawson5737]

My Dad was RMO to 11th Para Battalion at Arnhem. Ended up at the Schoonord hotel in Oosterbeek, captured, survived the war, married, had a great life and career. RIP Capt Stuart Mawson RAMC.

[@Donald-i7e7x]

I have visited several times over the years, had good food in the Schoohord, i think it was a dressing station when the battle was raging.

[@Rhudimi]

As a born and raised Arnhemmer, it is fantastic to hear these two gentlemen speak about the Battle of Arnhem and to walk the ground with their voices as a guide.

[@leemidgley5394]

Just heard Al say that he was in Arnhem in 1984 for the 40th anniversary and I was there too. I was with my Dad and a coach full of Royal British Legion members and three veterans, who were treated like royalty by everyone, young and old. Unfortunately one of the veterans actually died whilst we were there and it seemed rather fitting that he’d got back and showed his family where he’d been fighting. Loving your work guys, and thanks for your videos. Really informative and interesting.

[@DenUitvreter]

The jazzband, or whatever 'degenerate' music they were about to make, passing by reminded me of the 50th anniversary of the liberation in Groningen with a huge number of the Canadian veterans coming over. It was in early may and after a grey winter and early spring it was suddenly great summer weather and then the whole city burst into life even more than other years, it really blossoms in the sun. Girls in skirts cycling around with Canadian flags everywhere, all the terraces out, no one letting the veterans pay for drink, I've never been so happy with the weather because it put our freedom they fought for so much in their face. I really wanted them to see what it had resulted in and that freedom was not wasted on us at all. It was magnificent.

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

What a wonderful heartfelt comment. Thank you for sharing this memory with us all. Lest we forget.

[@andyathene8078]

What a duo … how cool are they ..Al’s knowledge is so detailed and told in an understandable way

[@jackwebb1606]

About a week ago, KZbin launched one of your videos straight into my feed like a paratrooper dropping behind enemy lines. I clicked out of curiosity, and before I knew it, I was pinned down, watching video after video. It’s been like a crash course through D-Day and Market Garden-I’ve gone back to the start of your channel and watched everything you’ve posted. What a mission it’s been, and I’ve loved every second of it! Your passion for bringing these battlefields and their history to life is truly remarkable. As a new channel, you’ve already achieved something special: you’re not just telling stories-you’re helping viewers like me walk in the footsteps of history, connecting us to the sacrifices and courage of those who fought in places like Arnhem. Please keep going! Your content is a vital reminder of the past, and I’m certain your channel will grow and inspire even more people over time. I’ll be standing by, ready for the next mission. Thank you for everything you’re doing! Jack.

[@ScottBailey-f5j]

Absolutely brilliant episode. Incredible insight into a truly awful day for the allies. Please don't stop Walking the Ground! Lest we forget

[@user-mc4sq3fk5d]

Brilliant?? I think overstating it?

[@StevenSwann-q1k]

Just finished reading Al’s Black Tuesday, seeing these videos really brings home the nightmare that was Arnhem, how close everything was. Great work Guys thank you

[@merlijnveijk855]

Hi Mister Murray. I would like to tell you I have been enjoying the series on KZbin about Arnhem. Your knowledge about the battle is enormous and I see you’re tell the story with so many passion. I my self are from Holland and as a kid I was very interested in the battle around Arnhem until I got the first ww1 virus and i still have that. But now and then I still go to Arnhem and walk around there. Thank you for the series about Arnhem Greetings Merlijn van Eijk

[@maikelvane5185]

This is better then regular tv. Visiting the grounds via two guys talking about what happened. It's like a virtual tour and makes it possible to learn more on site.

[@user-mc4sq3fk5d]

No desire to slam the two gents but did you really see much “ ground”?? Let’s not get carried away with over praising. The videos should be longer, have less talking shots and more showing of the actual sites.

[@maikelvane5185]

@ Valid points. What i ment it feels kind of genuine, two guys chatting over the subject. Like you would do with friends. I follow The Battlefield Explorer too. And he goes into a lot of details with photo’s. Which is another caliber.

[@doughudgens9275]

Just like last week’s comment, the maps and graphics help explain what the guys are talking about. The camera guy did the best on this episode at capturing what our hosts were talking about and pointing out. Maybe next battlefield, drop a camera on a tripod pointing in a good direction in addition to the hand held one. The overall concept is excellent. This ground level “walkabout” brings to life a battle especially when combined with individual soldier stories. Well done!

[@josephinekush5056]

I'm a big fan of Canadian broadcaster & journalist Stanley Maxtell, who produced the only on site recordings during Operation Market Garden. And in 1946 played himself in, "Theirs Was the Glory." As a young man I had the pleasure of knowing him & you guys truly bring the Arnhem story alive to those here, "across the pond" with your "Walking the Ground" series. I'm a Canadian Forces veteran, I've been to the sites you've visited & it all comes back in much fuller detail. As Maxtell often said, the greatest moment he ever experienced in his long was hearing those familiar Canadian accents as he reached the river's shore & safety. Keep them going. - Courtesy George K. Fort Macleod, AB. Canada. PS: If memory serves, I believe there were five (5) Canadian CANLOAN officers taking part in Market Garden. Someday you might briefly discuss CANLOAN on a podcast.

[@SteveR-w1q]

Can I say a big thank you for these walk on the grounds this year, but these market garden ones have been outstanding many thanks

[@philsosshep4834]

My grandfather was 11th battalion killed on the tues 19th by the railway cuttings . RIP sergeant Robert Thompson.

[@nigelbarrett4741]

Loved the moment with the musicians! “Thank God for peace”. Amen.

[@Troynl66]

probably studends from the conservatory around the corner

[@A.J.K87]

I know those streets pretty well. It's awesome to hear these stories. It never ceases to amaze and move me to live in an area with so much history.

[@davidbaker4533]

Great episode again chaps, things start to fall into place when you see the actual ground they were fighting over. Just brilliant!

[@jeffburnham6611]

The actual ground looked much different in 1944

[@radders4958]

Thoroughly enjoyed this series. Top work, Gents! #WeHaveWays

[@richardhoffmann179]

This is a great series. I have been to Oosterbeek and Arnhem back April 2010.

[@The_Oracle]

This is a great series. More please. Such knowledge

[@simonjohnson1585]

Sad and true facts, would love to share a pint and listen to your amazing knowledge first hand but will settle with watching this great series at home with a can. Thanks Al and James for sharing walking the grounds so we can understand better. All the best from Somerset 👍🏻👍🏻🍺🍺💯

[@TheVigilant109]

Great episode. I've gained a much deeper understanding of the battle thanks to Walking the Ground

[@alansimmonds9651]

What a great episode. Learning was happening with this one.

[@iainjones695]

Great series. Look forward to each episode.

[@davidmitchell471]

Superb explanation of the horrific events that unfolded in the bottleneck. Well done chaps. Keep the videos coming!

[@barrydonaldson]

Nice to have a Norman Collier reference... Well done!!

[@Jeroen_K]

Gents, pubs are the opposite direction, unless you wanted to properly earn a pint by walking to Oosterbeek.

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

@@Jeroen_K Haha, the truth of this is that they were heading towards the hire Volvo parked behind St Elizabeth Hospital, then decided town was nearly as close and turned around to head straight to the bar (leaving Producer Mike to get the car).

[@paulalberts4081]

@@WW2WalkingTheGround 😁

[@enright13]

​@@WW2WalkingTheGroundcan you tell us which pub they settled on/in? I was there in November and there was one with the purple and blue flag still hanging outside which also sold Guinness! Only pub in Arnhem where I could find it sold, and a great evening in there followed...

[@paulphillips9111]

Another great episode chaps , an excellent entertaining series keep them coming brilliant to watch can’t wait for the next episode so take it easy with beer 🍺🍺

[@Retrotoyguysi]

Great stuff, like having a personalised guided tour! I have friends in Arnhem so have visited the area many times so its great to see the places I know and being able to tie them in with history. One thing, your pronunciation of Oosterbeek, it should sound like OSTER-BAKE. The double O makes a Oh sound and a double E makes an A sound like a cockney shouting Hey! Keep up the great work chaps 😊

[@user-mc4sq3fk5d]

Do you reallyyy consider this a guided tour??

[@michaelhardie3639]

Really love this channel! I binged all videos in 2 days 😂 Will you be doing a Battle of the Bulge video series?

[@marcel-y8c]

i would love to meet you when you guys are back here! i live here in the city and still find many places and stories besides yours which are great to watch!

[@Norrie-jj2ve]

Yet again chaps, another awesome video, thanks for doing this...

[@dutchman8129]

So much history! There are still bunkers to be found in the area, dug in tanks, bullet holes and so much more

[@Wilfredhuddlestone]

Love the videos chaps!

[@saardewolf]

Please come back this year to walk the Airborne March on September 6th! Would love to have you join us here in Arnhem. 🙂

[@charlieclark5838]

Very interesting film, just started Al's Black Tuesday book today !

[@davidmitchell471]

It’s a superb read and an all new way of looking at the events of that pivotal day.

[@garrybrough72]

Another great episode lads. Keep up the good work team!

[@cameronsimpson-ld8nk]

Brilliant guys, I really love these narratives.

[@scootergoat98]

Interested to hear the thoughts James had.. Top work as usual gents

[@richardnorris3095]

Another fantastic video , really interesting listening to you both talk about what went on , enjoy your pint 🍺 👍🏻

[@adriang6259]

Brilliant video again chaps. Let's get to that pint.

[@lau03143]

I recommend sitting with Google maps open when watching these great videos.

[@beaujeste1]

Captain Peter Carrington of XXX Corps, was Lord Carrington as Foreign Secretary, under Maggie T. He was also head of NATO! Unfortunately we don’t have the same calibre and quality of politicians any more…

[@Alfie1970Waterhouse]

Thank you

[@PalleRasmussen]

Drinking The Pint. New Podcast guys.

[@adrianbay1496]

Cracking job chaps ! :)

[@rrl4245]

Brilliant series - great fun following along on Google Maps', street view...

[@EliteFuller]

great videos

[@hansgruber6358]

Great series loving it.. I have always been a bit suspicious of the numbers of German KIA/MIA numbers. How after all these years are the numbers still not confirmed?

[@RichardFox-nr3hj]

Phenomenal video gents- where on earth have you gained the knowledge Al? I know you from BDC but this part of WW2 and the code breakers are my thing - superbly put together vid 🦊

[@PGWoods-mp8qe]

I did the Nejmagen March in the eighties - very poignant

[@antonavila4723]

Liking and Subscribing, so Al and Jim can enjoy their pints in peace. 😅 My Dad got me Cornelius Ryan's book when I was 12, and it was a fair effort to really absorb it. By necessity of filmmaking, A Bridge Too Far could never do this justice. Just mind blowing and truly terrible. One Tuesday morning, just like that. To the entire production team, thanks for "walking the ground", absolutely illuminating in the best and worst of ways. 🍻

[@davemac1197]

I read it as a 15-year old in 1977. I now appreciate it is a very selective collection of personal accounts, which Ryan said he was more interested in than writing a comprehensive history. If you want the latter, I would recommend Swedish historian Christer Bergström's Arnhem 1944: An Epic Battle Revisited vols 1 and 2 (2019, 2020) as the most up to date comprehensive work. He uses unpublished documents and interviews in the Cornelius Ryan Collection held at Ohio State University, and he debunks the many myths from the Hollywood film.

[@antonavila4723]

@@davemac1197 My latest read was Beevor's "Arnhem". I'll definitely pick up Bergström too, thankyou for the recommendation!

[@davemac1197]

@@antonavila4723 - I think you'll notice the difference. I was so disappointed that I learned nothing from Beevor except a joke ('you know why it's called operation Market? Because we've all bought it'), my copy went to a charity bookstore, along with my copy of The Devil's Bridge by Anthony Tucker-Jones (2020). The Tucker-Jones book was supposed to be an update on the German perspective of the battle, but I would still recommend Robert Kershaw's It Never Snows In September (1990) despite it being out of date and containing some errors. The only problem I found with Bergström's volumes was that he used Kershaw's German order of battle (OOB) data for his sidebar panels, and even used two of them in reverse order chronologically, which doesn't make sense, so I would say don't take them for gospel, but Kershaw is still the best German overview, and Bergström is the best general overview and update on Cornelius Ryan. Online I would recommend TIKhistory KZbin channel for his MARKET GARDEN series, the long BATTLESTORM video on MARKET GARDEN or the short form episodes that break it up into smaller parts, and the videos on Gavin, Browning etc., are very good. TIK is very much on the right track because he is forensic in his study of the literature, so while I agree with him in terms of Gavin being responsible for the compromise at Nijmegen on the first day for example, he has not drilled down to reading specialist books like Phil Nordyke's regimental history of Lindquist's 508th PIR (Put Us Down In Hell, 2012), to get that whole story in greater detail, and it includes the important backstory to Lindquist's poor performance in Normandy for context. There's another way you can dive deeper into MARKET GARDEN for free online and that's the Cornelius Ryan Collection of his WW2 papers held at Ohio State University's Alden Library. The digital collection accessible online is not easy to navigate - the boxes and folders are not in any particular order, you have to browse them for anything that looks interesting, but I would say the two Gavin folders (Box 101 folders 09 and 10) are probably the most enlightening in terms of what he reveals and what Ryan chose not to publish in A Bridge Too Far.

[@peterblum613]

Brilliant job. Jim’s last thought was so characteristic. He was exhausted by having to listen to someone else. But let’s give Jim credit here: he controlled himself through most of this video and let Al share his expertise.

[@user-mc4sq3fk5d]

Brilliant? Really? You must mean the Brit use of brilliant not the actual use of the word in standard English.

[@markfreestone4579]

Brilliant and poignant as ever gentlemen…thank you

[@user-mc4sq3fk5d]

I wish Brits would stop using g the term brilliant in these cases as it diminishes the true definition of the word.

[@paulcopsey6573]

Don't tell us the ending now, I'm reading Al's book!! Great series guys, been to Arnhem a few times for work & oddly ended up at many of the principle locations including the drop zones, stayed in the hotel at Oosterbek, walked the woods, lanes & side roads. For my sins my career was in golf courses & purchasing grass seed & fertiliser from Dutch based manufacturers. In one of the golf courses club houses, built a few years ago is a great black & white aerial photo of the course & immediate surroundings with the out line of all the gliders landed superimposed using RAF photos & Intel pictures, so at some point during the first few day the RAF were taking pictures of the drop zones, if doing little else by way of tactical ground support

[@davemac1197]

I believe the older course at Rosendaelsche Golfclub (northern Arnhem) near the Saksen-Weimar barracks on Monnikensteeg was initially used by SS-Panzer-Regiment 9 to hide its tanks, based on a German source that the maintenance platoon was located there, as was a RAD camp (Reichs Arbeits Dienst - the state labour service), which would conveniently provide barracks and mess facilities for the crews. The tanks were then presumably taken into the Saksen-Weimar workshops to have their tracks and guns removed to render them administratively 'non-operational' to avoid the order to handover equipment to SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 at Vorden, before being dispersed under the trees on Heijenoordeseweg in western Arnhem on Friday morning 15 September, where I have a Dutch source that says a resident on the corner of Callunastraat got a knock on the kitchen door from SS panzer crewmen asking for spare ersatz coffee. They explained they had removed their tanks from the barracks to avoid possible bombing. SS-Panzer-Regiment 9 at Arnhem only had three Panthers and two Flakpanzer IV 'Möbelwagen', plus an 'alarm kompanie' of 100 Panther crewmen acting as infantry that had lost their tanks in Normandy, and the Regiment Werkstatt-Kompanie in the barracks.

[@johnpeate4544]

@@davemac1197 Dave, just read a footnote in Chester Wilmot's chapter on Market Garden in The Struggle For Europe. It says that Gavin was handicapped by a shortage of artillery ammunition as the four US truck companies sent up from France to maintain the American airborne divisions didn't reach the Meuse-Escaut Canal until the 20th and it was then found that they were loaded with the wrong type of 105mm ammunition and that some trucks had come up empty! Anyone info on this or if affected Gavin's decisions? US logistics seems to have descended into a real mess after the breakout from Normandy.

[@davemac1197]

@@johnpeate4544 - interesting. It does I think coincide with something I read last night - since Christmas Day I have been reading a requested gift, Aspects of Arnhem - The Battle Re-Examined, by Richard Doherty and David Truesdale (2023), and just getting towards the end of it before moving on to a speculative gift of Al's book Black Tuesday. The US Airborne Divisions had three battalions of field artillery equipped with 75mm Pack Howitzers, and one with the 105mm version. One battalion for the 82nd was air dropped on D-Day and had eleven out of its twelve 75mm howitzers in action within a matter of hours. Gavin received the rest of his artillery on D+1 in the second lift, although many gliders landed in Germany or south of the Reichswald, but most of the troops and guns were recovered and reached US lines. I know Gavin's artillery ammunition was limited in the first 24 hours until the second lift arrived, but I would have to research what the position was by 20 September. By that time there was Guards Armoured's artillery available and Medium Regiments from XXX Corps Artillery arriving too, and although ammunition was an issue because of the transport situation up the corridor, I'm not sure a specific issue for the 320th Glider Field Artillery Battalion (105mm) would have made a signifiant impact. Based on the Wiki page, it seems there was an issue with compatibility of the ammunition: _The weapon, initially designated T7, featured a barrel from the 105mm Howitzer M2, shortened by 27 inches (690 mm) and combined with the recoil system and carriage from the 75 mm pack howitzer. The howitzer was designed to fire the same ammunition as the M2 howitzer, however, it was found that the shorter barrel resulted in incomplete burning of the propelling charge. The problem could be solved by use of faster-burning powder, and otherwise, the design was considered acceptable and was standardized as the 105 mm Howitzer M3 on Carriage M3._ (M3 howitzer, Wikipedia) The propelling charge was in the shell cartridge and therefore special ammunition designed for the Pack Howitzer M3 would have to be used instead of the standard M2 shells. Interestingly, the ordinary infantry divisions in the US Army also used the 105mm Pack Howitzer M3 in its Infantry Regiment Cannon Companies, while the M2 was standard in the Divisional Artillery Battalions, so the whole US Army was using the same two different types of 105mm shell, M2 and M3, but the M2 was useless to the Airborne. The thing I was reading last night was about the supplies from Bradley's US 12th Army Group not being diverted as agreed to Montgomery's 21st Army Group, and they were quoting from Chester Wilmot about the supplies for Gavin and Taylor's divisions not reaching them until 20 September. They made the point that Wilmot's figures undermine's Eisenhower's claim that the supply situation was as serious as he claimed, and it shows that Eisenhower continued to supply Bradley instead of diverting the supplies to Montgomery, and he did this behind Montgomery's back. It's not clear if Eisenhower was conscious of this, as Bedell Smith had promised Montgomery everything he wanted, and then conspired with Bradley to renege on that promise. Patton launched a major attack on Metz during MARKET GARDEN, which was not what Montgomery was expecting at all, since Bradley was supposed to be prioritising his available supplies in US 12th Army Group to Hodges' US 1st Army at Aachen on Montgomery's right flank.

[@johnpeate4544]

@@davemac1197 Cheers Dave.

[@davemac1197]

@@johnpeate4544 - just been thinking about Gavin's problems on 20 September - the day the 504th, 2/505th and Grenadier Guards took the Nijmegen bridges - Gavin was pre-occupied with problems at Beek (508th sector) and at Mook (505th sector) with German counter-attacks. The Regimental Combat Team artillery assignments were: 504th PIR - 376th PFA Bn (75mm) - supported division at Groesbeek from D-Day, 504th on Waal from D+3 505th PIR - 456th PFA Bn (75mm) - supported 505th at Groesbeek from D+1 508th PIR - 319th GFA Bn (75mm) - supported 508th at Berg-en-Dal from D+1 325th GIR - 320th GFA Bn (105mm) - supported 505th at Groesbeek from D+1 and 325th from D+6 (23 Sept) I have all three 82nd Division PIR regimental histories by Phil Nordyke as well as Dutch author Frank van Lunteren's book on the 504th in MARKET GARDEN and just discovered through some searches there's a book on the 325th GIR I should probably investigate. There's very little on the 320th GFA in any of the books I have and no mention of being short of ammunition. Attacks on the 505th were broken up by the 456th PFA, supported by the 376th as well. Once the 325th GIR arrived (2/401st GIR were attached as their 3rd battalion until this became consolidated in 1945), the 320th doesn't get a mention, being part of the 325th's Regimental Combat Team. I'm sure the ammunition story is true, but it doesn't show up in the literature I have, so possibly no more of an issue than the various problems across the division.

[@cbk1961]

I think Cain is the father of Jeremy Clarkson first wife, Jeremy did a little talk about him.

[@CosplayingHistoryNerd]

Yes, he did the program V For Valour which centred on his first father in law but also the Victoria Cross in general

[@davemac1197]

*Cain. Robert Henry.

[@dankorolyk5917]

Great episode but unfortunately a very sad ending.

[@Troynl66]

I was born in the Elisabeths hospital and went to school in the large building you see in front at 3:03 but I never knew this part of the battle

[@davemac1197]

I'm going to blow your mind now, because if your school is the Montessori College that Al and James are about to walk past, it was previously the Van Lingencollege since 1983, and before that in 1944 it was the Christelijk Lyceum School and occupied by a Luftwaffe unit - II./Luftnachrichten-Regiment 213 (former IV./Luftnachrichten-Regiment beim I. Jagdkorps) under Hauptmann Willi Weber. I believe the building also housed the 'Y-Arnhem' bureau, and both were involved with the radar and radio direction-finding development and installations of the 'Teerose' I, II and III stations located up on the high ground east of Deelen airfield at Terlet ('Teerose' I and III) and the Rozendalsche Veld ('Teerose' II). These stations detected Allied bombers and were used to direct the interception of nightfighters from Deelen and update the situation plotted at the 3.Jagd-Division control bunker 'DIOGENES' at Schaarsbergen under Generalmajor Walter Grabmann. On Sunday 17 September, Weber was having a meeting with his company commanders at Terlet when the landings began and he decided on his own intiative to mobilise a force of about 90 of his signals troops from 'Teerose' II and III ('Teerose' I was now only a training unit) and drove by trucks to the Amsterdamseweg opposite the British Landing Zone 'S' at Reijerscamp and were the first German troops to engage 1st Parachute Battalion at the junction of Wolfhezerweg with Amsterdamseweg before withdrawing to the prepared defence line around Deelen airfield as they had been officially instructed in case of emergencies. After this first engagement, elements of 9.SS-Panzer-Division arrived in the area on the Amsterdamseweg. The training staff of 'Teerose' I based at Terlet were sent by bicycle to the II./Abteilung headquarters in the Christelijk Lyceum School and I believe with the technical support staff of the Abteilung attempted to establish a roadblock against the British advance into Arnhem, but the Luftwaffe signals and technical staff were not trained as combat troops to fight paratroopers and were easily brushed aside by Frost's 2nd Battalion heading for the bridge. Most histories barely mention Kampfgruppe Weber, being only a small unit of Luftwaffe signals staff, and the unit should not really have got involved as they had assigned defensive positions at Deelen they were supposed to man in the event of an attack, and some of his men resented Weber's actions because of the heavy casualties they sustained in attacking the landing zone. It probably gets more mention in Robert Kershaw's It Never Snows In Septembr (1990) than anywhere else, and there's some information on the 'Teerose' radio-direction and radar stations on the web, mostly by local Dutch researchers. I thought you might like to know that however small, your school did play a part in the unfolding drama of the battle of Arnhem.

[@Troynl66]

@@davemac1197 interesting, yeah I went to the diogenes bunker this year. I also believe the school functioned as a german hospital or an HQ during the battle of grebbeberg in 1940.

[@davemac1197]

@@Troynl66 - I haven't researched 1940 very much - I imagine it was probably an HQ because it's already right next to a hospital with 300 beds and there were several other hospitals in Arnhem. Schools make ideal accommodations for headquarters - the ULO School on Heselbergherweg was occupied by Feldkommandantur 642 (General Kussin's military HQ for the Gelderland and Overijssel provinces) as well as the nearby Villa Heselbergh, which was a nunnery. Also De Witte School in Guitenkamp and De Malburcht in Zuid-Arnhem on Graslaan were occupied and marked on Allied defence overprint maps as having multiple vehicle bays - I suspect they were used by Luftwaffe Flak troops. There was a heavy Flak battery on the other side of Huissensestraat on the polder.

[@66kbm]

So, unknown to me and probably many others, Who was tasked to take the Bridge initially? We know Major Frost got there, but in the greater plan, who was meant to be with Major Frost?

[@davemac1197]

Lieutenant Colonel Frost's 2nd Battalion was tasked with taking three bridges along his riverside road route - Oosterbeek rail bridge (C Company), the Arnhem pontoon bridge (B Company) - actually a civilian 'ship bridge' and not a military structure, and the main highway bridge (A Company). Lt Col John Fitch's 3rd Battalion was to support Frost by going directly to the highway bridge via the main Utrecht road and occupy the eastern sector of the town, while 2nd Battalion occupied the western sector. Lt Col David Dobie's 1st Battalion was held back for an hour on the DZ as a reserve, then released for its task to occupy the high ground north of Arnhem to block the main routes the Germans were expected to use for reinforcements, with Company strongpoints on the Amsterdam and Apeldoorn roads and a Company in reserve. In Phase 2, the 4th parachute Brigade was to relieve 1st Parachute Battalion to the north with 156 and 10th Para in line and 11th Para in reserve. 1st Airlanding Brigade would move to Phase 2 positions forming the western outer perimeter around Oosterbeek, with 1st Border and 7th KOSB in line and 2nd South Staffords in reserve. In Phase 3 when the Poles arrived, they would occupy an outer perimeter in the eastern sector of Arnhem, including the river Ijssel bridges at Westervoort, again with two battalions forward and one in reserve. Note the two battalions from 1st Airlanding and 4th Parachute Brigades sent into Arnhem to support the 1st Parachute Brigade push to reinforce Frost at the bridge (the Staffords and 11 Para), were the battalions designated as the brigade reserves in the divisional plan, so these were logical choices made by Brigadier Hicks as temporary Division commander when faced with these decisions. When he gave Hackett the 7th KOSB to compensate for removing 11th Para, they were already tasked in Hackett's area to secure Landing Zone 'L' for the Polish glider element to land on D+2, so it was another logical choice that did not change its tasking, only the command structure.

[@jrd33]

@@davemac1197 I'm getting more useful info about Market Garden from your youtube comments than I do from most books on the subject. I've been saving copies of your posts for later reference. Do you plan on publishing all this knowledge you have accumulated?

[@davemac1197]

@@jrd33 - thank you, and you're not the first person to suggest I write a book, but I'm too busy still reading and collecting new books on the subject to be working on a book myself! I think you have to find a niche that someone hasn't tackled before or find a new angle, because a comprehensive history in great detail would be beyond what publishers are willing to handle - it would cost too much and crush your coffee table under the incredible weight of it, so you have to focus and specialise or do something different. That's how I feel about it. I've currently just started reading Al Murray's _Black Tuesday_ (2024), a Christmas gift not requested - I'm not sure why you would do one day any more than why Rob Kershaw chose _A Street In Arnhem_ (2014), but Al is very knowledgeable (I've yet to spot an error from him) and so you just never know what he might have turned up. I gladly assist authors working on their own projects. I recently met Dr Sebastian Ritchie of the RAF's Air Historical Branch when he held a lecture on _Arnhem: The Air Reconaissance Story_ in the Cold War Museum at RAF Cosford on 17 September, to mark the 80th anniversary. He's the author of _Arnhem: Myth and Reality: Airborne Warfare, Air Power and the Failure of Operation Market Garden_ (2011, 2019), and also conducted a study of the missing aerial photo of German tanks near Arnhem that was found in a Dutch government archive in 2014, and that study was first published in 2016 as _Arnhem: The Air Reconnaissance Story,_ a free pdf booklet you could download from the MoD RAF web site, updated in 2019 and an abridged version of the story included in the 2019 edition of _Myth and Reality._ He's currently working on a third edition using more photos and new material on the 'Hermann Göring' training regiment that owned the older obsolete tanks in the photo - the reason Browning dismissed them as evidence of a 1944 panzer division refitting in the area. I was able to give Seb some information on the HG Regiment regarding their equipment in July and August from the German LXXXVIII Armee Korps records he was not aware of, and we've been discussing this and other related issues by email since then. The link to the booklet is no longer active on the RAF site since the lecture event, but I would guess it will be reactivated when the third edition is available. I understand the main hold-up is trying to find the copyright owner of a photo of a Panzer III knocked out at Wolfswinkel (near Son) credited to the US Signals Corps. The first edition is still available on the Dutch Vrienden Airborne Museum web site, if you want to check that out. Have to warn you the photo of the Panzer II wreck in Nijmegen does not belong to the HG regiment as captioned in several books - I was able to convince Seb it belonged to Panzer Kompanie Mielke from Panzer-Ersatz-Abteilung 11 at Bocholt in Germany - it's a long story! The other author I semi-regularly correspond with is Australian Scott Revell, who wrote _Arnhem, a Few Vital Hours: The SS-Panzergrenadier-Ausbildungs-und-Ersatz-Bataillon 16 at the Battle of Arnhem September 1944_ with Niall Cherry and Bob Gerritsen (2013, revised 2021), and _Retake Arnhem Bridge - An Illustrated History of Kampfgruppe Knaust September to October 1944_ with Bob Gerritsen (2014). He has been too busy of late with work, family, and Reserve Army commitments (he holds the rank of Brigadier in the Australian Reserve Army Signals), but assures me in 2025 he is changing jobs that require only 50% of his previous workload and he can get back to research and writing again. His current projects are a book on Flak Kampfbrigade Svoboda, another more general book on Flak in the Arnhem area, and Security Units at Arnhem (Sicherungs-Regiment 26 in the Netherlands and Sicherungs-Infanterie-Bataillon 908 at Arnhem/Deelen). I've been doing a lot of work on Flak units in the Arnhem and Nijmegen area myself and we were able to swap information and fill in some blanks and resolve some headscratching mysteries we both encountered, so it has already been very productive. I re-established contact with Scott before Christmas when I sent him a heads-up email about Dutch expert on German armour Marcel Zwarts' new book _Einsatz Arnhem: German Armoured units and their opponents at Arnhem and Oosterbeek September 1944_ (2025), which is due for release in February. Scott's reply was that he was not only aware of it but had contributed "a heap of information, so it should be good" - I should have known! It's a big coffee table type of book in the same style as the excellent Jack Didden and Maarten Swarts books, _Autumn Gale_ (2013) on Kampfgruppe Chill and Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559, _Kampfgruppe Walther and Panzerbrigade 107_ (2018), and _The Army That Got Away_ (2022) on 15.Armee, and updates his own more modest Concord book on _German Armoured Units At Arnhem_ (2001), which Marcel says is outdated and contains some errors. A preview and sample pages of the new book is on his web site called 'einsatz-arnheim' (note the German spelling of "Arnheim"), if you want to check that out as well. Almost all of the books I would recommend are specialist books of some sort, usually limited print runs and quite expensive, but the one general overview I would recommend over the 'conventional narrative' people like Beevor or Buckingham is Swedish historian Christer Bergström's _Arnhem 1944: An Epic Battle Revisited vols 1 and 2_ (2019, 2020). He has used unpublished documents and interviews from the Cornelius Ryan Collection and also debunks the many myths in the Hollywood film version of _A Bridge Too Far_ (1977). The only caveat is that Bergström used Robert Kershaw's German order of battle data in his sidebar panels from _It Never Snows In September_ (1990), which is an excellent pioneering work on the German side of the story I would still recommend, but now also a bit outdated and contains some known errors. I got a funny story from Scott - he said he once asked Rob Kershaw about some data in his book and Rob said he couldn't answer the question because after several house moves in the Army he had lost track of his research notes!

[@carthy29]

There is docu on you tube about a theory that a dutch double agent tipped off the germans pre market garden - also, model was an excellent field marshal known for his quick reactions to battle situations - a bridge too far indeed, nearly worked though

[@davemac1197]

If the Germans were sent any information on the airborne operation they did not act on it and the movements of the 'Hohenstaufen' SS Division are the proof. All the evidence is that the Germans were completely surprised by the depth and scale of the airborne landings. The betrayal theory was debunked by a Dutch researcher, Colonel T.A. Boeree in his 1963 book De Slag By Arnhem, English language edition with Cornelius Bauer published as The Battle of Arnhem (1966). Boeree's research papers and correspondence between Gavin (who investigated these claims himself) and Cornelius Ryan are in the digital archive of the Cornelius Ryan Collection held at Ohio State University's Alden Library online, box 101, folder 09: James Gavin. In their correspondence, Gavin assures Ryan he is convinced the claims are nonsense and on the Christiaan 'King Kong' Lindemans affair Ryan complains that Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands has "a burr under the saddle about the whole thing and is almost bludgeoning me to put it in the book." Ryan considered the theory worthy of a footnote and no more. The only prediction of landings near Arnhem were made by Generalmajor Walter Grabmann of the Luftwaffe 3.Jagd-Division at Deelen airfield, who realised the fields around his accommodations in the grounds of the Wolfheze psychiatric hospital were ideal landing zones and Model's HQ might be vulnerable - Model was unconvinced, feeling safe so far behind the lines and so many river barriers, but Sepp Krafft of the SS training battalion 16 was an old friend of Grabmann's when they both served in the German police before the war and he took the warning seriously and moved his two training companies out of their Arnhem barracks and camped north of Oosterbeek as additional protection for Model. This was why he was unexpectedly in an ideal position to block the first movements off the landing zones on D-Day of the operation and delayed them long enough for alarm units of the Hohenstaufen Division to move into the area.

[@chriswaterworth6843]

I thought Arnhem was flat, didn’t realise how hilly it is.

[@davemac1197]

Glacial moraine. School geography!

[@markrunnalls7215]

Absolutely mind blowing stories of what your telling.. Quite a few years ago while at the smugglers pub at Totness we where very privileged to be visited by a Mr Bingley who was an Arnham vet .. Some of accounts he gave just where unbelievable to listen to .. Excellent as ever, this battle and others like it should never be forgotten.

[@chrisarnold4709]

So desperately sad really when you think less superficially about it, such a wasted opportunity for which so many paid the ultimate price.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Still worth trying moreso than the Hurtgen Forest and Metz debacles.

[@merlijnveijk855]

Always wondered if maybe half of first airborne would have been on the north side of the bridge instead of just the 600 of Frost and his men. What would have been the outcome? I mean if 600 could hold out for that long, how long would have been if half was on the bridge? And what would it be interesting to do a tour with Al Murray around Arnhem and Oosterbeek.

[@davemac1197]

British Airborne doctrine was that a division could operate independently for eight days if fully resupplied by air. 1st Airborne at Arnhem received less than 10% of its resupply by air and held out at Oosterbeek for nine days. 1st Parachute Brigade (plus support units) were due to take Arnhem alone for operation COMET, 1st Airlanding Brigade at Nijmegen and 4th Parachute Brigade at Grave, with the Polish Brigade landing at Grave as reinforcement in the second lift. COMET was not deemed to be strong enough when intelligence was received that II.SS-Panzerkorps had been ordered to the eastern Netherlands to refit.

[@dolgorwel]

Interesting obs that the Brits were dropped North of the bridges at Arnhem and went for the bridges immediately because human survival instinct dictates that their saviours were coming over the bridge from the south. If only the 82nd, Gavins drop had landed North of Nijmegan they would have also gone for the bridge immediately as it would have been their route to survival.

[@davemac1197]

Gavin told A Bridge Too Far author Cornelius Ryan that the British wanted him to drop a battalion north of the bridge, and while he said he toyed with the idea, he eventually discarded it because of his experience in Sicily with the scattered drop disorganising the division for days. He opted instead to land his parachute regiments together in a "power center" and have the battalions fan out towards their objectives. This might have worked if he had assigned the more aggressive and experienced 505th PIR to the Nijmegen mission instead of the 508th, as Colonel Lindquist failed to interpret his instructions properly and send his 1st Battalion directly to the bridge as Gavin had instructed. Instead, Lindquist sent a reinforced platoon led by the 1st Battalion S-2 (Intel) Section to recon the bridge and report on its condition before sending the battalion, and while the patrol got split up, the 3-man point team from the S-2 Section reached the bridge and took the southern end and seven prisoners without firing a shot, proving that the battalion could have done it if they had been sent in time. After waiting an hour until dark for reinforcements that never arrived, the point team decided to withdraw and heard "heavy equipment" arriving at the other end of the bridge as they were leaving. It's interesting that the highly experienced Colonel Reuben Tucker of the 504th insisted on a special drop zone for one company to land south of the Grave bridge to enable it to be assaulted from both ends, and he got it. You're correct if you're assuming Gavin assigned his best regiment - the 504th - to Grave, because it was on the Division supply line to XXX Corps. What is controversial was the decision to assign the 505th to a purely defensive role facing the Reichswald and the German border against possible counter-attacks that could threaten his airhead, and 1st Airborne's supply line was therefore accorded the lowest priority with the 508th. Especially considering that Gavin told Cornelius Ryan that neither he nor 82nd CO in Normandy, Matthew Ridgway, could trust Lindquist in a fight, and neither of them would promote him or because of his seniority in the grade could easily promote another Colonel in the Division over him. It explains why Gavin did not replace himself as Assistant Division Commander when Ridgway went up to US XVIII Airborne Corps in August and Gavin inherited the Division, so he was running around like crazy doing both jobs during MARKET GARDEN. Browning had also originally selected a drop zone at Elst, midway between Nijmegen and Arnhem to drop a third brigade of 1st Airborne Division, but this was denied by Brereton (1st Allied Airborne Army) on the grounds that there were insuffficent aircraft. Brereton's MARKET plan was a recycle of his earlier LINNET (Tournai) and LINNET II (Liège-Maastricht bridges) air plans and he was not prepared to reallocate aircraft from Gavin and Taylor's divisions, despite them having three complete parachute regiments with battalions in reserve roles on D-Day, while Urquhart had barely two brigades landed and no reserves at all for his Phase 1 tasks. Sources: Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967 (box 101 folder 10: James Maurice Gavin, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University) The Military Life and Times of General Sir Miles Dempsey - Monty's Army Commander, Peter Rostron (2010) September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus (2012) Put Us Down In Hell - The Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012) The 508th Connection, Zig Boroughs (2013), Chapter 6 - Nijmegen Bridge

[@RupertBear412]

you guys should do a collab with @ww2wayfinder - he does brilliant then and now comparisons with photos where they were taken and he also walks the ground - he has a brilliant YT channel

[@GrahamRozee]

Do you guys have any info on the 10th Battalion HLI ? My dad was in them and I've read that they were involved in operation Market Garden.

[@davemac1197]

All three Corps of British 2nd Army were involved in MARKET GARDEN, but 10th HLI were part of 227 Brigade in 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division in XII Corps on the left flank of MARKET GARDEN, so they were not involved in the airborne battles on the XXX Corps centreline of the operation. XII Corps progress started late and was slow due to the lack of supplies promised by Eisenhower's Chief Staff Bedell Smith, which were cancelled by Bradley, who resented the transport from three of his divisions in US 12th Army Group being used as part of the agreement and cancelled the arrangement without informing Montgomery. The 15th Division attacked across the Wilhelmina canal at Best around 24 September, where there was a significant battle for several days after XII Corps' initial advance was led by 53rd (Welsh) Infantry Division from the start line on the Meuse-Escaut canal. At the start of MARKET GARDEN on 17 September, the road bridge at Best was targeted by US 101st Airborne Division's General Taylor as an alternative crossing to the Son bridge further east, despite it being a bridge that Dempsey (2nd Army) neither requested nor had any use for in the airborne operation, presumably because it was on the main Eindhoven-Hertogenbosch road that went northwest from XXX Corps sector into the XII Corps sector. The US platoon sent to take the bridge got cut off (and the bridge blown by the Germans) in a prolonged battle that eventually sucked in the rest of the Company, Battalion, and most of the 502nd PIR. The airborne battle at Best led to the worst casualties in the 101st and was the one where Captain LeGrand 'Legs' Johnson was critically wounded and found in a 'dead pile' by his Sergeant, Charles Dohun, who saved his life by putting him into a Jeep along with some other critical casualties and drove them through the Sonsche forest - crawling with German troops from the Wilhelmina canal defence line - to the 101st's field hospital at Son, where Dohun pulled his pistol on a Major conducting triage in order to get Johnson seen to by the Division Surgeon. A version of this true story was featured in the Hollywood film A Bridge Too Far (1977), with Dohun's first name changed to 'Eddie' and Johnson's name not used but the character appears in the credits as 'Captain Glass' because their characters were reversed to get actor James Caan on board - he was originally offered the role of Johnson but thought the Sergeant was more heroic, so the Sergeant was made the older veteran and the Captain a green officer. The German troops engaged at Best by 101st Airborne and later 15th (Scottish) Infantry Divisions were from the 59.Infanterie-Division, the leading unit of 15.Armee that had escaped across the Scheldt estuary west of Antwerp and had started to arrive in the area at the time MARKET GARDEN started. If you want to learn more, I suggest you search for information on 227 Brigade and 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division, under which 10th HLI served at the time. In terms of reading, I only have one reference covering this area, Autumn Gale / Herbststurm - Kampfgruppe Chill, schwere Heeres Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 and the German Recovery in the autumn of 1944, by Jack Didden and Maarten Swarts (2013), which has great detail on the battles on the left flank of MARKET GARDEN involving XII Corps and their German opponents. You might be better off looking for any publications specifically on 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division or the Highland Light Infantry regimental histories.

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

@@davemac1197 Those 3 cancelled divisions were originally for the US 1st Army to support Monty's flank I believe?

[@davemac1197]

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- it was the logistics transports belonging to three divisions in Bradley's US 12th Army Group that were supposed to deliver supplies to 21st Army Group instead - I don't know which divisions. I think I'm right in saying Bradley split most of his supply in favour of Patton, who launched a new assault on Metz during MARKETGARDEN, when his available resources were supposed to go to Hodges' US 1st Army to conduct further operations against the Aachen gap and keep up pressure on the German units there. It certainly had an impact on Arnhem as the Germans switched 9.Panzer and 116.Panzer-Divisions from Aachen to Arnhem in late September for the 5 October counter-attack, and then sent them back again (largly refitted with troops from training units in action at Arnhem) for the 'second battle of Aachen.' StuG-Brigade 280 and schwere Panzer-Abteilung 506 were also both destined for Aachen, but partly diverted to Arnhem (one battery of 280 and two companies of 506 went to Arnhem).

[@MegaJean40]

cheers

[@wessexdruid7598]

9:24 - that's not a Para cap badge that George Lee (Leigh?) is wearing...

[@lauriepocock3066]

For the first time, I can start to understand the difficulties. In the film, you get the impression that it all happens around the bridge, but it doesn't. Really the film is all about the commander's sloppy shouldering all the mistakes they made onto Monty's shoulders. Maybe that last bit is unfair because what I take away from all these films you have made is just how unorganised this operation was, both British and American. Did we expect too much from1stAAA, had they not had time to gel as a fighting unit.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Montgomery is even mocked in the dialogue before the operation begins, with von Rundstedt saying Eisenhower is not stupid enough to let Montgomery lead the advance instead of Patton. You can tell the tone of the film (heavily slanted towards the American market) from that moment on.

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

@@lyndoncmp5751 That was all largely a hollywood construct, the Germans in reality had Abwehr units that were following both Eisenhower and Monty as they were the men at the top making strategic decisions for the NWE theatre

[@lyndoncmp5751]

​@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-Yes absolutely. There was not even one top German commander who expected Patton to lead the allied advance on Germany. Why would they? Montgomery was the most prominent and experienced western allied general. The Germans didn't even think Patton was more of a threat than Hodges, as can be seen by their divisional deployments.

[@jrd33]

Market Garden was a risky plan which required some luck to succeed, but that is true of many military operations. Pretty much every decision taken by 1st Airborne after the landing went badly wrong, culminating with the decision to send four battalions of infantry into a frontal attack on dug-in enemy troops with armoured support in excellent defensive terrain, with the enemy having firing positions on both flanks. It is hard to think of a more stupid plan, and it destroyed the ability of the division to do anything except dig in and hold on for the remainder of the battle. Field Marshall Montgomery had very little ability to affect Market Garden once the operation had begun.

[@ducomaritiem7160]

Ha❤😂! WALKING THE GROUND appears, sit down, watch! (Ok, just had a Alfa Pilsener)😊 So, What's next boys?

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

We are currently in the Ardennes filming The Bulge!

[@sgtmajvimy]

please, make it a proper PUB, not a Sports bar ! ... Cheers from Canada :) All the Best Gentlemen !

[@Dangerous27Dave]

I hope you enjoyed your pints.... I just hope James' wasn't bitter..........

[@blue2sco]

This was a massive operation. Was there any way this could of succeeded?

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

We think so but there's a lot of what ifs. With airborne operations it's about speed, something that proves a sticking point across a lot of Operation Market Garden. As Al says, if they had come up this road on Sunday or Monday they had a shot at it. Speed issue also hits the 82nd at Nijmegen.

[@davemac1197]

The main compromises were made by Brereton's 1st Allied Airborne Army to Browning and Dempsey's original outline plan, and Browning could not object after already objecting to Brereton's previous LINNET II operation and threatened with replacement by Matthew Ridgway and his US XVIII Airborne Corps. Nor could RAF 38 Group commander Leslie Hollinghurst or Montgomery's representative David Belchem (21st Army Group GSO 1 (Ops) Officer) prevail upon air transport commander Williams or Brereton respectively to reinstate the proposed double airlift for D-Day. The tactical compromise on the ground occurred at Nijmegen when Colonel Lindquist failed to send his 1st Battalion 508th PIR directly to the bridge after landing as Gavin had instructed, and the background to that goes back to the 508th's first operation in Normandy. Paul Williams of US IX Troop Carrier Command also deleted Browning's selected drop zones for the 101st between Valkenswaard and Son to quickly take the Son-Eindhoven-Aalst bridges on the grounds of Flak around Eindhoven, and Brereton refused a third brigade drop at Elst between Nijmegen and Arnhem on the grounds of insufficient aircraft - despite Gavin and Taylor both having all three of their parachute regiments landed with battalions in reserve roles on D-Day. Brereton would not re-allocate aircraft to Urquhart's division, so Urquhart could only land two brigades on D-Day with no reserves at all in Phase 1. If the original concept of the "airborne carpet" plan drawn up by Browning and Dempsey had been preserved and not compromised by the USAAF air commanders to protect their own assets, and Gavin assigned the more aggressive and experienced 505th PIR to the Nijmegen mission, the tanks could likely have been in Arnhem in one or two days.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

@davemac1197 Brereton, as Commanding General of First Allied Airborne Army should not have followed Williams of the USAAF Troop Carrier Command and put the well being of the Troop Carrier Command personnel ahead of the well being of his own paratroopers being dropped begin enemy lines. This is unforgivable to me. Brereton was still acting as though he was more concerned with his fellow USAAF men. Totally the wrong man to command the First Allied Airborne Army. He gets away with the fatal decisions he made. Not enough people, particularly historians, criticise him. He's also totally absent from A Bridge Too Far, so those with just a passing interest in Market Garden have no idea about him.

[@davemac1197]

@@lyndoncmp5751 - I totally agree with your conclusion - Brereton was not even on the shortlist of USAAF officers considered for the role, but the preferred candidates could not be released from their current assignments - they were considered too important. The Air Force just wanted a body, anybody, to fill the position so that Browning couldn't be appointed. William Lee - the most senior officer in the US Airborne until he had his heart attack and had to be replaced as 101st commander by 82nd artillery commander Maxwell Taylor, might have been a preferable candidate, but really there was none on the American side. As previously discussed, Ridgway was only a Major General and only just promoted from 82nd Division commander to command XVIII Airborne Corps after Brereton and Williams were appointed to the new Army, so he was too junior. The whole idea of an air force officer being in command of airborne troops is "ass-backwards", and MARKET GARDEN proved it. I'm currently reading _Apsects of Arnhem - The Battle Re-Examined_ by Richard Doherty and David Truesdale (2023), and while it contains some errors (the Hohenstaufen did not have 20 Panthers before the battle) their analysis of Brereton and other's involvement I think is excellent and they have drawn on previous analyses and debunked some errors by other historians. Eisenhower's logistics figures for example, were incorrect and based on intent that did not come to pass - if the stuff doesn't arrive, it doesn't count! Eisenhower let Montgomery down by not delivering on a promise to give him the necessary priority on supply because he was lobbied by Bradley, and Bradley got his way without notifying Montgomery. Not much on Williams in A Bridge Too Far (1974), just this paragraph: _On the morning of the eleventh, after a hectic night of assessing and analyzing aircraft availability for the attack, Major General Paul L. Williams, commander of the U.s. IX Troop Carrier Command, and in charge of all Market air operations, gave his estimate to Brereton. There was such a shortage of gliders and planes, he reported, that even with an all-out effort, at best only half the troop strength of Browning's total force could be flown in on D Day. Essential items such as artillery, jeeps and other heavy cargo scheduled for the gliders could be included only on a strict priority basis. Brereton urged his air commander to explore the possibility of two D-Day airlifts but the suggestion was found impractical. "Owing to the reduced hours of daylight and the distances involved, it would not be possible to consider more than one lift per day," General Williams said. It was too risky. There would be no time for maintenance or battle-damage repair, he pointed out, and almost certainly "casualties would result from pilot and crew fatigue."_ Williams was working within a restriction laid down by Brereton on flights conducted entirely in daylight. The RAF suggestion of flying the outbound leg of the first airlift and the inbound leg of the second airlift at night for a dawn and late afternoon delivery of the troops on D-Day was rejected - by both Williams (on appeal by Leslie Hollinghurst of 38 Group RAF) and Brereton (on appeal by David Belchem as 21st Army Group GSO 1 (Ops) representing Montgomery). Williams had been happy to fly the suggested schedule for COMET when it was only two of his Troop Carrier Groups involved and he was attached to the all-British operation under Browning, but he had changed his tune when Brereton was planning MARKET. So, Williams had previously been helpful, but was now uncooperative, and the change can only be due to Brereton's decision on daylight only flights, no doubt to meet Eisenhower's demands to improve the navigation issues of the TCGs. It was an arbitrary decision and unnecessarily restrictive. I was reading the previous night about Brereton's early response to the failure of the operation - he started writing his memoirs before the war ended, no doubt to ensure his version got out first! Just listen to this nonsense quoted in Doherty and Truesdale (p. 162): _Despite the failure of the [Second] Army to get through to Arnhem and establish a permanent bridgehead over the Lower Rhine, Operation 'Market' was a brilliant success. The 101st Division took all its objectives as planned, the 82nd Division dominated the southern end of the bridge at Nijmegen until noon of D plus 1, by which time it had been planned for the Guards Armoured to be there; the 1st British Division similarly dominated the Arnhem bridge from its northern end until noon of D plus 3, 24 hours later than the time set for the arrival of the [Second] Army. Hence the airborne troops accomplished what was expected of them. It was the breakdown of the [Second] Army's timetable on the first day - their failure to reach Eindhoven in 6 to 8 hours as planned - that caused the delay in the taking of the Nijmegen bridge and the failure at Arnhem._ (Brereton, _The Brereton Diaries: The War in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941-8 May 1945,_ p. 360) Williams had objected to Browning's drop zones for the 101st between Son and Valkenswaard, intended to help to secure the Son-Eindhoven-Aalst bridges, on the grounds of Flak around Eindhoven. The Aalst bridge was only 4 km beyond Valkenswaard, where the Guards stopped for the night with one hour of daylight remaining. The next day they were held up for most of the day (completely wasted) at the Aalst bridge over the Tongel Reep stream by a battery of four 8.8cm Flak guns and two StuG IIIG assault guns with supporting infantry, while a means of by-passing them was sought. The Germans abandoned their guns in the late afternoon when they heard that US paratroops had entered Eindhoven to their rear. Williams' objection, no doubt with Brereton's approval, had ensured the Guards would not be able to linkup with the 101st on D-Day. Had they done so, even if the Son bridge was still demolished, the bridging equipment would have reached the site 24 hours earlier, and the Guards would be in Nijmegen on the morning of D+1. If the Nijmegen bridge had been in US hands and British troops landed at Elst, there would be nothing to stop the Guards reaching Arnhem by the evening of D+1. This was the scenario imagined by Montgomery, Dempsey, and Browning, but frustrated by Brereton, Williams, Gavin, and Lindquist.

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

@@davemac1197 If the Polish brigade had been deployed with the British earlier it would have helped them

[@darthcheese7971]

Al mentioned that the paras couldn't tease out the panzers. But didn't explain why. Anyone know?

[@davemac1197]

German armour was very wary of British anti-tank guns since the Normandy campaign and couldn't afford the losses by this stage of the war. Model had only 84 operational panzers in his entire Army Group B in the September returns, which by a bizarre coincidence matches exactly the number of 6-pounder and 17-pounder anti-tank guns in the combined establishments of the British 1st Airborne Division and Polish Parachute Brigade. Even Tiger I tanks deployed against Frost at the Arnhem bridge that were hit, but not penetrated, by his anti-tank guns persuaded them to withdrew. Frost was blasted and burned out of his positions by artillery and fire, and the same tactics were used against the divisional perimeter in Oosterbeek, which was well covered by anti-tank guns. Tanks and assault guns were stalked by PIAT until the ammunition ran out ,because the Germans avoided the anti-tank guns' sight lines. Some guns never got to fire more than one or two shots of AP during the entire siege and even at the bridge the Germans recovered unused 6-pounder AT rounds from the British perimeter, which only collapsed when Frost's force ran out of small arms and PIAT ammunition. Sources: The 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery At Arnhem: A-Z Troop volumes, Nigel Simpson, Secander Raisani, Philip Reinders, Geert Massen, Peter Vrolijk, Marcel Zwarts (2020-2022)

[@darthcheese7971]

@davemac1197 thanks very much. I assumed it was down to previous experiences but wasn't sure.

[@davemac1197]

@@darthcheese7971 - it was. They still feared aircraft ("jabos") the most, but their experience in the Netherlands was that the Dutch had planted trees along the main roadsides since Napoleonic times to shelter marching troops from the sun, so they found they could move armour even during the daytime. Naval artillery (when in range), and then British anti-tank gunnery was considered the next most lethal danger.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

​​@@davemac1197Yeah, and after the newly arrived King Tigers of Schwere Panzer Abteilung 506 lost one of them at Oosterbeek on the 24th, the first day of their employment in the battle, I don't believe they ever sent any more of their King Tigers into those streets at Oosterbeek. Although the next day another King Tiger was lost in Arnhem at Weverstraat by the school when a mortar hit a fuel tank and the King Tiger blew up. Tanks are at a huge disadvantage in urban settings where there are enemy troops close by.

[@davemac1197]

@@lyndoncmp5751 - I don't think they did. I was impressed by Don Burgett's (A/506th PIR) sighting of German tanks attacking Opheusden on 5 October 1944 in support of 363.Volksgrenadier-Division, where he identified a column of Panthers led by a single 'Royal Tiger' - which is impressive recognition because these tanks have a very similar profile. The lead Tiger could only be from schwere Panzer-Abteilung 506 (probably from 3.Kompanie), and the Panthers were from I./Panzer-Regiment 24, which was a unit refitted with Panthers and assigned to 116.Panzer-Division 'Windhund' because the refit of the Division's own I./Pz.Rgt.16 was not yet complete. Both the 9.Panzer-Division (Heer not SS) and the 116.Panzer-Division had been transferred from Aachen to Arnhem in late September after the Airborne battle was over and involved in the 5 October counter-attack all around the 'island' designed to eject Allied forces and retake the Nijmegen bridges. The 10.SS-Panzer, 9.Panzer, and 116.Panzer-Divisions under II.SS-Panzerkorps were in the east based on the Pannerden-Huissen-Arnhem crossings respectively, were supported by diversionary battalion attacks of mixed battlegroups from Division von Tettau (under XII.SS-Armeekorps) attacking across the Rijn ferries, such as Kampfgruppe Hansmann using the Renkum ferry into the E/506th PIR sector at the famous 'crossroads' between Randwijk and Heteren. Burgett later made a similar observation at Noville, northwest of Bastogne, in the opening phase of the surrounding of Bastogne when he saw a Royal Tiger spearheading a column of Panthers from 2.Panzer-Division approaching their position, and the Tiger was from the same unit, s.Pz.Abt.506. This seemed to be a common tactic of spearheading divisional tank attacks with Tigers from a heavy Abteilung.

[@armholeeio]

So When are Jim and Al starting their own battlefield tour business, History and Drinking it will be a good money spinner

[@brettgreene4341]

Robert Cain was also Jeremy Clarkson's father in law

[@davemac1197]

*Cain.

[@Mag_Aoidh]

I love watching you guys, but it drives me crazy how much you interrupt each other. It’s very hard to pay attention when there’s so much chaos. Let the one who’s more knowledgeable talk about the subject and wait for him to stop speaking.

[@adkelders1636]

First rate, nothing more to say.

[@garybrazier948]

Will you be walking the perimeter

[@WW2WalkingTheGround]

We have a few episodes coming up which feature the Oosterbeek perimeter

[@garybrazier948]

@WW2WalkingTheGround excellent, im walking it in March.

[@jandenijmegen5842]

@@garybrazier948 It is very interesting and the perimeter did not change that much. Be brave and from Oosterbeek walk into the city of Arnhem using one of the approach routes e.g. along the hospital/museum.

[@marcuskiritsis2076]

I could watch this all day. Read black Tuesday recently which was an incredible tale of bad luck, bad decision making and sheer adrenaline in the face of such adversity, we must never forget these brave heroes who were willing to “give it a go” at what cost to them ? They don’t make them like that anymore do they ? Men were real men and I truly can feel their personal pain of defeat after literally throwing the kitchen sink at the Germans. Lest we ever forget this battle. 😔😔😔🫡🇬🇧🫡🇬🇧

[@markdonovan500]

The more I read about Arnham, I'm convinced the Germans knew they were coming, could they of landed anywhere closer?

[@davemac1197]

The betrayal myths were debunked in 1963 with the publication of Dutch Colonel T.A. Boeree's research in De Slag By Arnhem, and the English language edition with journalist Cornelius Bauer as The Battle of Arnhem (1966). Boeree studied the movements of the 9.SS-Panzer-Division 'Hohenstaufen' and found that they were in the process of being withdrawn to Germany for refit, so only a number of 'alarm' companies - the only combat troops left in the division and the last to be entrained for Germany - were in the Netherlands on Sunday 17 September. One more day and they would have been gone too. There is some evidence that intelligence reports on a pending airborne operation in the Netherlands was sitting on a desk as yet unread, when the operation started, but the Germans had absolutely no intelligence that was acted on. There's quite a bit of correspondence between Cornelius Ryan and Gavin about the betrayal theories and Gavin was convinced they were nonsense after investigating them himself. Ryan complained that he was under a lot of pressure from Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands to include the Christiaan 'King Kong' Lindemans story and "has a burr under the saddle about the whole thing, almost bludgeoning me to do it in the book" (box 101 folder 09, Cornelius Ryan Collection digital archive, Alden Library Ohio State University). The only 'forewarning' that was acted on was a speculative warning from Luftwaffe Generalmajor Walter Grabmann of the 3.Jagd-Division at Deelen airfield, who told SS-Sturmbannführer Sepp Krafft of the SS-Panzergrenadier-Ausbildungs-und-Erstaz-Bataillon 16 at a dinner (they were friends since both had served in the German police before the war) that the fields around Grabmann's officer accommodations in the grounds of the Wolfheze psychiatric hospital were ideal airborne landing zones and thought that Model's new headquarters at Oosterbeek would be vulnerable. Model had dismissed the warnings, thinking he was safe so far behind the lines and behind several river barriers, but Krafft took the possibility seriously and had his two training companies camped around Oosterbeek as additional protection for Model instead of in his depot barracks in Arnhem. The barracks were bombed on the morning of 17 September and Krafft's battalion was ideally placed to block the first advances of 1st Parachute Brigade from the landing zones into Arnhem. There were no suitable landing zones closer to the bridges. The area south of the highway bridge on the Malburgsche Polder had a heavy Flak battery right next to it off Huissensestraat and another heavy battery on the Meinerswijk Polder to the west - both belonging to gemischte-Flak-Abteilung 591 and each battery was equipped with six captured French Schneider 75mm Mle 36 - known as 7.5cm Flak M.36(f) in German service. There were also one and a half batteries from leichte-Flak-Abteilung 845 clustered around the southern access to the bridge with 2cm and 3.7cm kanon. The Abteilung 845 commander, Major Hans Lange, told Cornelius Ryan (box 132 folder 05 in the CRC) he thought when he was ordered to detach these batteries from his unit at Leeuwarden airfield in the northern Netherlands that someone in the High Command had a premonition or actual information there would be airborne landings, but there's no evidence of this. The area was unsuitable for large scale glider landings, criss-crossed by small drainage ditches restricting landings and vehicle and artillery extraction. The zone was also crossed by two high tension lines from the Arnhem power station southeast of the bridge. The proposed solution for the probem of the distances from the objectives of the most suitable landing zones was the dawn glider coup de main assaults, planned for the Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Grave bridges for operation COMET by Browning and carried over into the expanded provisional operation SIXTEEN outline when COMET was cancelled. The outline involved adding the two US Airborne Divisions at Nijmegen and Eindhoven, and once approved by Eisenhower at his Brussels airport meeting with Montgomery was taken back to England by Browning for detailed planning by Brereton's 1st Allied Airborne Army into what became MARKET. It was here that Brereron took control over the planning and decided against the double airlift on D-Day, to conduct all flights entirely in daylight, and that ruled out the dawn glider raids on the bridges as too risky in broad daylight. Browning was unable to object after nearly being replaced for objecting to Brereton's previous operation LINNET II plan, and Montgomery sent his Ops Officer David Belchem to impress apon Brereton the need for the double airlift on D-Day to no avail. Brereton would not change the air plan again, and if it came to it had the authority to cancel the operation altogether. So, the area south of the Arnhem bridge was deemed suitable only for the parachute element of the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade on D+2, by which time it was assumed the British 1st Parachute Brigade would occupy the area (it was 1st Battalion's Phase 2 task) to clear the Flak, and the Division's Royal Engineers were due to rendezvous at the power station and take control after completing their Phase 1 tasks. Obviously, in the event this was not possible, and the reason the Polish drop was re-arranged for Driel to support the Division perimeter at Oosterbeek.

[@jandenijmegen5842]

Conspiracy theories. If the Germans had known it, paras would have been shot out of the air in Oosterbeek/Arnhem/Ginkelse heide , Groesbeek/Nijmegen/Heumen/Overasselt/Grave/ Son and so on. If the Germans would have known, the fields for gliders would have been blocked. If the Germans had known, John Frost would never ever have taken the northern approach to the Arnhem road bridge. it is so easy to defend as this video proves. Landing closer gets you either into the city, into the river or into muddy river banks. Have a look for yourself. By the way: Arnhem, not Arnham. It is in the Netherlands.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

The caution of the air forces commanders wouldn't allow it.

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

@markdonovan500 The Germans only knew they were coming because someone thought it was a bright idea to bring the PLANS on a bloody glider with them 🙄

[@davemac1197]

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- General Kurt Student (whose 1.Fallschirm-Armee HQ was at Vught near the glider crash site) was interviewed by Cornelius Ryan and he says the documents were not the operational plans but a number of admin documents for 101st Division, of which the most useful was a supply roster that enabled Student to extrapolate the airlift schedule for all three divisions. He did not know the ultimate objective from the documents, but guessed it was Arnhem. His problem was that he was unable to transmit the information to the army for 48 hours, by which time von Rundstedt, Model, Bittrich, Harzer and Harmel already knew what all the objectives were. Student was only able to contact his own Luftwaffe chain of command and arranged for fighter aircraft to be over the landing zones at the appropriate times - but the subsequent airlifts were all delayed by weather in England and the transports arrived when the fighters were back at their bases in Germany being refuelled. The captured document actually helped the Allies. The interview is not in the Cornelius Ryan Collection digital archive online as far as I can see - not all of Ryan's papers have been digitised by the Alden Library at Ohio State University, but if you spot something in the catalogue linked from the home page that you would like added, you can send a request form to the librarian for the documents to be scanned and added. I got two boxes relating to Flak Abteilung commanders (Lange and Majewski) added recently and it took seven weeks for them to turn the request around. Ryan talks about the Student interview in one of the Gavin folders - box 101 folder 09 page 95-96 - letter from Ryan to Gavin re security leaks.

[@MegaRebel100]

Caine was in a bbc program of Jezza was his wife dad .. program ove rthe VC ,s ..

[@jodu626]

yeh the boys have mentioned it in podcasts

[@davemac1197]

*Cain, Major Robert Henry. Caine, Michael was the actor in the Hollywood film.

[@matts7377]

Very good program by Clarkson, among his best work.

[@TheGixernutter]

Enjoy your pint. In the Airborne pocket.

[@Andy-co6pn]

A brilliant and sobering subject, raised a smile at Jack Reynolds defiance and the Norman Collier reference. Great work boys

[@markrunnalls7215]

Had to listen to it again as wife turned the rudy washing machine on..😂😂