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Grim trigger is an extremely vindictive strategy, forever punishing someone for a single misstep. Can less aggressive strategies still inspire cooperation?
Tit-for-tat begins by cooperating and then duplicates the opponent's strategy from the previous period. Consequently, a single defection does not lead to continued defection forever. It is a Nash equilibrium for two players to adopt tit-for-tat for sufficiently high discount factors, but we will later learn that it is NOT a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Nevertheless, tit-for-tat has performed very well in computer tournaments of the repeated prisoner's dilemma. Check out The Evolution of Cooperation for more about this. It's an excellent book: amzn.to/1oZNRv6